The Use of Digital Technologies in Caucasian Jihadist Propaganda: From Websites to Digital Jihadist Jamaats
Keywords:
Caucasus, jihadism, digital ethnography, propaganda, recruitmentAbstract
This article examines the evolving role of digital technologies in the activities of Caucasian jihadist movements from the early 2000s to the present. Drawing on digital ethnography, qualitative content analysis, and secondary sources, the study identifies how jihadist groups in the North and South Caucasus have used online platforms for propaganda, recruitment, mobilization, and operational coordination. The analysis emphasizes both the regional specificity of these networks and their integration into wider transnational jihadist ecosystems. The findings show that the earliest phase of online jihadist activity in the Caucasus relied on static websites that disseminated multilingual propaganda, including sermons, battlefield footage, and ideological manifestos. These resources served to legitimize violence and foster community among sympathizers. With the rise of social media across the post-Soviet space, jihadist actors shifted to interactive environments. After the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, they began constructing Digital Jihadist Jamaats - virtual communities that became arenas of ideological socialization and pathways from passive sympathy to active participation. Recruitment strategies typically involved a two-stage process. Initial exposure occurred on open platforms such as VKontakte, Facebook, or YouTube, followed by redirection into privacy-focused messaging applications like Telegram or Signal. These secure spaces minimized surveillance, enabled trust-building, and supported logistical coordination. Such practices proved effective, contributing to the departure of thousands of fighters from the Caucasus to Syria and Iraq. Online platforms also facilitated instructional propaganda. Jihadist actors circulated manuals on improvised explosives, operational security, and small-scale attacks, often translated into Russian. In parallel, networks engaged in intelligence gathering and surveillance of security forces. Documented cases in Georgia revealed attempts to collect personal data on law-enforcement officers and to plan attacks on symbolic sites. Jihadist groups also adopted financial and technological innovations. Cryptocurrency enabled fundraising, while bots, automated accounts, and pseudo-news portals amplified propaganda. More recently, artificial intelligence and deepfake technologies have been used to enhance the credibility and reach of jihadist messaging. These developments highlight the adaptability of jihadist actors in exploiting emerging technologies. The study situates these findings within a framework that combines digital ethnography, framing theory, and transnationalism. The article’s key contribution is the introduction of the concept of the Digital Jihadist Jamaat. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this represents the first scholarly application of the term. It captures the hybrid nature of jihadist online formations, which function both as arenas of ideological interaction and as mechanisms that bridge digital engagement with offline mobilization. By advancing this concept, the study contributes to the analysis of Caucasian jihadist activism and to broader debates on political Islam and digital extremism.References
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