The Ideological Foundations of Russia’s Expansionist Policy in Russian Political Philosophy and Concepts

Abstract

The research topic involves analysing the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. For 70 years, the Soviet Union, together with the United States, shaped the international agenda. Over several decades, the state that had held the status of a superpower lost most of its territories in 1991, relinquished its spheres of influence, and, having been a superpower, the Soviet Union's legal successor, the Russian Federation, became a secondary player on the international stage. Even today, the majority of Russian Federation citizens "lament" the Soviet Union’s loss, and conspiratorial theories about the West’splans to dismantle the USSR continue to emerge. Most of the population still views the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a great mistake. One reason for this nostalgic attitude is that Russia, the Soviet Union’s legal successor, deliberately avoids addressing the objective reasons for the dissolution, such as the dominance of gerontocracy, an ideologised and resource-dependent economy, unsuccessful foreign interventions, and the funding of these interventions (the Afghan War), as well as the free financial and military assistance provided to the socialist bloc. Russia’s current political elite benefits from the romanticising of the Soviet Union, which prevents the necessity for democratic changes from entering the public agenda. Creating the image of an enemy is an easier path, consolidating the nation around its leader. In an article published on December 30, 1999, titled "Russia at the Millennium's Crossroad," Putin clearly asserted:"Russia was and will remain a great state." He outlined the primary contours of his governance in the article: "A strong state for the Russian people is not an anomaly" (Putin, V. 1999). A sense of national revival and the return to former greatness emerged within society. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing political and social vacuum of the 1990s, Putin began to fill this void by appealing to national interests and pride. In the 2000 Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept, Russia explicitly defined its zone of privileged interests. For the first time, dissatisfaction with the economic and forceful dominance of the USA and the growing trend of creating a unipolar world structure was openly stated. The concept declared Russia as a major Eurasian superpower. The primary area of interest identified in the concept was the development of a good-neighbourly strategic partnership with the CIS states, emphasising the importance of considering Russia's interests in these countries, including the rights of Russian populations within them (Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept, 2000). In 2001, Putin symbolically reinstated the Soviet anthem. On May 16, 2003, in a message to the Federal Assembly, Putin again declared the post-Soviet space as a zone of strategic interest (Message to the Federal Assembly, 2001). In 2005, he referred to the dissolution of the Soviet Union as "the greatest catastrophe of the century" (Message to the Federal Assembly, 2005). Russia’s political establishment could not accept the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the formation of independent states from its former republics. As political scientist Belkovsky wrote in an article published on January 19, 2004, in Komsomolskaya Pravda, "Our nation has a single fate – imperial" (Belkovsky, S. 2004). In 2008, Medvedev declared the post-Soviet space as Russia's zone of privileged interests. In the same year, Russia’sforeign policy concept emphasised Russia’s negative attitude toward NATO's expansion, particularly regarding Ukraine and Georgia’s plans to join NATO, as well as NATO's military infrastructure approaching Russia’s borders. This topic remains relevant, as Putin’s Russia has not freed itself from imperial ambitions, which directly threaten the territorial integrity and sovereignty of neighbouring states. This is evident in cases such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Putin effectively uses the policy of creating an enemy, where, for some reason, everyone is against Russia, everyone wants to defeat it, and any legal measures or actions by post-Soviet countries aimed at limiting Russian influence are deemed Russophobia. Russia also manages to use external interventions to conceal its internal problems. In August 2008, before the war, and in 2014, before the annexation of Crimea, despite a sharp fall in oil prices and a challenging socio-economic situation, Putin’s approval rating surged after these interventions, even though the socio-economic conditions did not fundamentally change. In this context, an in-depth study of Russia’s foreign policy in the post-Soviet space is essential, as Russia is the only state actively using all possible mechanisms to reassert influence over the “near abroad,” and is the only country capable of unilaterally changing the political map of its neighbouring states. In many cases, the West fails to assess Putin's policies properly. While geopolitics has lost significance in the West, Putin’s Russia acts precisely in geopolitical terms, grounding its foreign policy on the balance of power and "privileged interest zones." Putin’s geopolitical pragmatism can be seen as counter-revolutionary and revisionist, aiming to reassess the results of the 1990s "end of history" and restore Russia’s lost positions on the global stage, directly affecting the territorial integrity and independence of post-Soviet states. Therefore, for these countries, the greatest existential threat today comes from Russia’s postmodern empire and its expansionist foreign policy, which enjoys full support among the Russian population (as seen in Putin's popularity after the annexation of Crimea and the Russia-Georgia war). Research novelty: The research does not limit itself to addressing the issue from a single perspective. It also explores the problem’s cause-and-effect relationships in a historical retrospective. The study identifies and analyses the prerequisites and factors that significantly influenced the regional political and economic agenda in the post-Soviet space. The originality of the research does not lie in its thematic focus, as the real relevance of the issue to post-Soviet states has already drawn the attention of many scholars. However, its originality lies in the attempt to approach the issue from all sides, aiming to eliminate any bias. Methodology: The research methodology is qualitative. Primary and secondary sources were analysed. To analyse Russia's foreign policy and explore the theoretical foundations of its expansionist policies, an in-depth study was conducted on the Russian Federation's national security concepts, national security strategies, and foreign policy doctrines. Secondary sources were utilised to elucidate the ideological foundations that underpin Russia's political culture and its current expansionist policies in the post-Soviet space. For this purpose, the research drew on the fundamental works of scholars who follow Russian geopolitical concepts, including Slavophilism and Eurasianism. The focus was on theses that help readers find a "logical" explanation for contemporary Russian foreign policy and its attitude towards the West. Additionally, foreign academic works specifically addressing the post-Soviet space and analysing Russia's interests in this region were examined.