Power Configuration and Democratization Dynamics in Post-Soviet Georgia

Abstract

In recent decades, a profound crisis of representative democracy has become evident in the democratic world, including traditional Western countries. Georgia's case warrants special analysis as the general crisis of democracy here is complicated by local post-Soviet specifics. To deeply understand these intricacies and the country's political dynamics, we can employ two influential theoretical frameworks: Michael Mann's theory of sources of power and Charles Tilly's analysis of the relationship between state capabilities and levels of democracy. Michael Mann, in his fundamental work "The Sources of Social Power," argues that social life and historical development are shaped not by a single dominant factor, but by the interaction of four main, interconnected, yet analytically distinct sources of power. These sources are ideological (control of meanings and norms), economic (control of production and resources), military (control of organized coercion), and political (control of centralized governance, primarily through the state). According to Mann, the relative importance and interaction of these four sources vary historically, and their specific configuration determines the structure and developmental trajectory of a given society. Charles Tilly, particularly in his works on state formation and democratization, focuses on two key but independent dimensions: state capacity—the state's actual ability to implement policy, mobilize resources, and maintain a monopoly on violence—and the level of democracy—the degree to which state actions are subject to broad, equal, protected, and mutually binding consultations with citizens. For Tilly, it is important to note that increasing state capacity does not automatically result in deepening democracy. Examining Georgia's post-Soviet history through this theoretical framework reveals how the dynamics of power sources and the uneven development of state capabilities and democracy have led to the current crisis. Immediately upon gaining independence, several factors emerged that distinguished the Georgian political landscape from the European one: the absence of a tradition of mass, ideologically structured parties, the personalistic nature of politics, the dominance of project-based NGO sectors instead of strong, autonomous interest groups (such as trade unions), and a centralized tradition of governance. Additionally, the social structure was characterized by massive deindustrialization, economic transformation, high unemployment, and the near non-existence of strong, autonomous workers' organizations. This made it impossible to form a unified working class as a political subject, a key force for democracy in the West. Simultaneously, the middle class was fragmented and largely dependent on external or internal (often state) resources, which hindered its opportunities for collective action and autonomous organization. Critically, it is the organizational weakness and fragmentation of these two broad social strata—the working class and the middle class—that prevents the formation of effective coalitions between them. Historically, such inter-class alliances have played a decisive role in democratization processes in other countries. Their absence or weakness in Georgia seriously undermines the prospects for democratic consolidation and contributes to the maintenance of elite, non-representative politics. Under these conditions, the struggle for power began, characterized by constant fluctuations among Mann's four sources. In the early years of independence, ideological power was dominant, although the political, economic, and military bases were critically weak. Consequently, state capabilities (in Tilly's terms) were extremely low, and the level of democracy rapidly declined. Following civil conflict, Shevardnadze came to power in a chaotic situation marked by fragmented paramilitary forces. This period saw political power almost entirely replaced by decentralized coercion, further weakening state capabilities and nullifying democratic processes. From the mid-1990s onwards, a gradual confrontation with this legacy began, along with the formalization of political power. State capabilities and the formal level of democracy slowly improved, but both remained low, as economic power largely continued to operate informally. Between 2004 and 2012, there was a dramatic concentration of political and ideological power, accompanied by a sharp increase in state capabilities (according to Tilly). Economic power also grew, although it was often subject to political control, indicating a complex synthesis. Despite this increase in state capacity, the quality of democracy substantially declined. This exemplifies Tilly's divergence: an increase in state capacity occurring alongside weakening democracy. After 2012, the state capabilities achieved in the previous period were maintained and, in some areas, improved. However, the configuration of power shifted again, with a growing influence of economic power, particularly capital associated with the ruling elite.