Russian Propaganda and its Influences in Georgia and Estonia

Abstract

After Russia's war in Ukraine, Russian propaganda, which has been actively working for years as the weapon of the hybrid war, has returned to the daily agenda. The war made clear the parallel reality that the Russian propaganda media offers its viewers. The paper aims to review the Russian propaganda media channels, how the information about the Russian-Ukrainian war is getting to the audience from these sources, and how it impacts Georgia and Estonia. The Russian Federation has been using propaganda as a weapon to pursue its interests in different countries for years. Over the years, its quality and scale have become more and more refined, which has become even more apparent in recent years. Despite repeatedly stated foreign orientation, given Georgia's geopolitical location and other factors, anti-Western propaganda remains a significant challenge for the country. In parallel with the unequivocally pro-Western course of striving for integration into European structures, the propaganda narrative, the fake news, which acts on a predetermined target audience, is intensifying. The Russian government is using hybrid warfare for political purposes, primarily to weaken pro-Western governments, create a precondition for war, and create divisions in these countries. In 2016, a document signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin read that information technologies play a unique role in times of conflict. According to the same doctrine, Russia indicates the possible use of information-psychological factors of other countries. In 2018, Ukrainian researcher Maxim Kiaik published an article on the specifics of Russia's information war on the example of Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine. In an article published in Ukraine Analytica, the author notes that observations of the 2007 cyber-attack on Estonia, the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, and the events in Crimea in 2014 showed that Russia is fighting these countries in better and better ways with each subsequent conflict. Recent reports from the Georgian State Security Service show that only the methods of hybrid warfare attempted by different states, the stirring up of anti-Western sentiments in the society, and the tactics of influencing the foreign course chosen by the country are changing, which is becoming more sophisticated. Consequently, misinformation, fake news, and propaganda from different countries remain challenging. In 2017, the Media Development Foundation, in partnership with partner organizations in Ukraine, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, published a study called the Kremlin Index of Influence. The authors aimed to measure the mechanism of influence of the Russian Federation on the information spaces of other countries. As we learn from this research, Russian propaganda in Georgia is complex, including Russian propaganda platforms and Georgian tabloid media outlets. The threat was exacerbated in February 2022 when Russia decided to attack Ukraine. Georgia and Estonia have undergone development and democratization processes since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Numerous studies have shown that both countries have been important targets of Russian propaganda. In various ways and resources, Russian disinformation has often harmed the development of these countries, especially the share of ethnic minorities in these two countries and the degree of their access to Russian-language broadcasting. In addition, the pro-Russian and violent group Alt Info in Georgia, which actively broadcasts and tries to spread Russian disinformation narratives, is noteworthy. The paper reviews the role of Russian disinformation and false news about the impact of years of Russian hybrid warfare on Georgia and Estonia. The thesis will cover the experience of these countries in the fight against Russian disinformation and what did or did not change the Russian-Ukrainian war. With the help of a qualitative research method, content analysis, and qualitative interviews, the paper will find out the main frameworks by which the information is disseminated in the Russian Federation, Georgia, and Estonia.