Georgia-EU: Refusal of a Near-Achieved Goal

Abstract

As a small and weak state, Georgia lacks the capability to independently ensure its vital national interests (sovereignty, territorial integrity, security, and the welfare of its population). Therefore, its primary goal must be to have a strong and reliable ally and friend that will protect and assist it. Since Georgia restored its independence, three viewpoints on foreign policy choices have emerged: orientation toward Russia, neutrality, or the West. Of these, the first option was unacceptable to the vast majority of the Georgian population. The second was impossible, as Georgia met none of the conditions required to receive guaranteed neutrality. The third, which primarily implied integration into the European Union, was the most popular, yet the most difficult to implement. To achieve a country's accession into any union or alliance, three conditions must be met: 1) The desire of the vast majority of the country's population. 2) The government's efforts to achieve this goal. 3) The consent and interest of the members of the receiving alliance or union in accepting a new member. The first condition is the most evident. The vast majority of Georgia's population supports integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. This was confirmed by a study conducted under our leadership in 2022 across four regions of Georgia (Tbilisi, Mtskheta-Mtianeti, Kvemo Kartli, and Javakheti). 88.6% of respondents favor joining the EU, while only 10.5% believe Georgia should reject it. This sentiment can be explained by both pragmatic considerations and national identity, specifically, the self-perception of being part of the European cultural-civilizational world. The second condition, the government's effort, spans a long period. Throughout Georgia’s history, whenever the alternative was West or East, Georgian authorities chose the West and Europe. This was true during the brief period of independence in 1918-21 and again after 1991. The Western orientation of the Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze, and Saakashvili administrations is an indisputable fact. "Georgian Dream," which came to power in 2012, continued this foreign policy course, resulting in the 2014 Association Agreement and the 2017 visa liberalization. The third condition, the EU's consent, was the most difficult to achieve due to several serious obstacles: 1) Geography: Many in Europe believe the Caucasus is Asia (specifically the Middle East), which should exclude Georgia from EU membership. 2) Civilizational Belonging: The view that Europe is a Western (Catholic-Protestant) civilization and that the Orthodox world is not "fully European." 3) Readiness: Whether the candidate meets EU political and economic criteria. 4) Geopolitics: EU entry for former Soviet republics means removing them from Russia's sphere of influence. Many felt Europe was unwilling to confront Russia, offering only "Associate" status and visa-free travel to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. These four factors made EU membership seem like a distant, perhaps impossible, prospect. However, the war initiated by Russia in February 2022 showed the West that decisive steps were needed. What seemed distant became reality: in June 2022, Ukraine and Moldova received candidate status, and in December 2023, Georgia received it as well. In this situation, the Georgian government unexpectedly and sharply changed not only its policy toward the EU but its entire foreign policy orientation. Since April 2024, Parliament has passed a series of anti-democratic, repressive laws that directly contradict EU legislation. Following a questionable victory in the November 2024 parliamentary elections (the results of which the EU has not recognized), Prime Minister Kobakhidze announced that Georgia is suspending all negotiations regarding EU accession until 2028. Despite continuous protests from the population, the government has intensified an anti-Western campaign, effectively declaring the EU an enemy of Georgia and the Georgian people. This "anti-European hysteria" has essentially detached Georgia from the West. In the words of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, only the "name" remains of Georgia's EU candidate status. The current policy of the Georgian government completely contradicts the European aspirations of the population and can be assessed as a betrayal of national interests. This move has also squandered the EU's willingness to allow Georgia to become a dignified member of the civilized world. Given how many opponents Georgia already had within the EU, there is a real danger that such an opportunity may never arise again, leaving Georgia permanently cut off from Europe. It is difficult to explain this step taken by the Georgian government. Therefore, we are forced to limit ourselves to various assumptions, two of which seem most credible. The first is that granting candidate status to Georgia showed Russia that it was finally losing the country, leading it to use threats and blackmail to force the Georgian government to adopt a course that would preclude its accession to the European Union. The second assumption is based on the premise that the Georgian government has transformed into an autocratic and undemocratic authority. Under the conditions of European democracy, they have no chance of winning elections or maintaining power. Consequently, the only way out for them is to reject the European Union.