Education Policy Agendas of Radical Right Populist and Eurosceptic Parties in Serbia and Georgia

Abstract

This paper explores how radical right populist and Eurosceptic parties in postcommunist Europe approach education policy, focusing on a comparative analysis of Dveri in Serbia and Alt-Info in Georgia. Although recent research has begun to examine far-right education agendas in Western Europe, much less attention has been paid to countries outside the EU. It is a significant gap, as political actors in postcommunist settings operate within different historical legacies, institutional constraints, and trajectories of European integration. By examining Serbia and Georgia, the article asks what kinds of education policy agendas these parties advance, where they overlap, and how far existing analytical frameworks help us make sense of their positions. The study employs a comparative case study design and qualitative content analysis of party manifestos and digital communication. The empirical material consists of Dveri’s manifesto and Facebook posts, and Alt-Info’s Facebook posts and YouTube videos, collected between June 2022 and June 2025. Hence, the paper is guided by the framework developed by Berg, Jungblut, and Jupskås, which distinguishes among redistributive, governance, and content dimensions of far-right education policy. At the same time, the article evaluates whether this framework is sufficient for understanding the education agendas of radical right populist and Eurosceptic parties in postcommunist contexts. The findings point to a clear pattern of convergence in some areas. In redistributive terms, both Dveri and Alt-Info support a strong role for the state in education. Rather than promoting market-oriented reforms, they favour increased public funding, protection of small schools, and various forms of social support, including measures targeting teachers and students. This orientation contrasts with much of the existing literature on Western European far-right parties and can be linked to the legacy of state-led education systems as well as broader dissatisfaction with liberal reforms associated with Europeanisation. At the same time, the two parties diverge quite sharply when it comes to governance. Dveri places emphasis on decentralisation and institutional autonomy, presenting these as necessary steps to reduce corruption and political interference. Alt-Info, by contrast, argues for stronger central control and a more directive role for the state, particularly as a way to shield the education system from what it sees as harmful external influences. These differences highlight that far-right education agendas are not internally consistent and are shaped by specific national political environments. In terms of content, however, the similarities are more pronounced. Both parties advocate a vision of education centred on national identity, religion, and traditional family values, while opposing gender-related and LGBTQ+ topics in schools. Yet these shared positions are framed differently in each case. In Serbia, Dveri links education to demographic concerns and the preservation of national identity, whereas in Georgia, Alt-Info situates its arguments more explicitly within a broader narrative of sovereignty and resistance to Western influence. Building on these findings, the paper argues that a fourth dimension—internationalization—should be taken more seriously in the analysis of far-right education policy. In both cases, education is not treated solely as a domestic policy field but as a site of contestation over external influence and geopolitical alignment. Both parties portray Western-led reforms, including the Bologna Process, as undermining national traditions, while simultaneously idealising earlier models associated with the Yugoslav or Soviet past. This suggests that, in postcommunist contexts, education policy is deeply embedded in broader struggles over sovereignty, identity, and international orientation.