Three No's Principle: China's Policy Toward North Korea's Nuclear Program

Abstract

China identifies nuclear non-proliferation on the Korean Peninsula as a central interest but remains North Korea’s main political, military, and economic partner. Despite Beijing’s potential leverage, Pyongyang has steadily advanced its nuclear program, even writing nuclear weapons into its constitution in 2023 as vital to its survival. China’s approach is guided by the long-standing “Three No’s”: no war, no chaos, and no nuclear weapons. The first principle reflects Beijing’s determination to prevent military conflict, which would destabilize East Asia and impose heavy political and economic costs. The second stems from fears that excessive pressure could collapse the North Korean regime, triggering refugee flows, undermining Chinese stability, and inviting greater U.S. military presence near its borders. North Korea’s role as a buffer state further reinforces Beijing’s desire to preserve the regime. Although preventing conflict and instability outweighs denuclearization, Beijing also views a nuclear-armed North Korea as a threat to its interests. Pyongyang’s nuclear tests have provoked military buildups among U.S. allies and raised the risk of regional proliferation, outcomes directly opposed to China’s strategic goals. Moreover, North Korea’s pursuit of “Juche,” or independence from foreign powers, limits Beijing’s ability to control its neighbor. To address these challenges, China has promoted diplomacy and multilateralism. It was a key participant in the Six-Party Talks, which offered North Korea economic aid and security guarantees in exchange for denuclearization. However, the failure of these talks and Pyongyang’s continued weapons development left Beijing balancing international demands for sanctions with its overriding interest in regime stability. Ultimately, China’s policy reflects a careful balancing act: it seeks denuclearization but prioritizes stability. The “Three No’s” remain the foundation of Beijing’s approach, yet they also constrain its ability to halt North Korea’s nuclear advance — a dilemma that could increasingly undermine China’s regional influence.