Power Diffusion and the Hybridization of International Order

Abstract

Some schools of International Relations (IR) theory view international politics as a multi-actor process. Among these, several theorists emphasise power diffusion as a central feature of digital globalisation. Joseph Nye highlights how this diffusion leads to an unprecedented decentralisation of power and alters the logic of international order. Ian Bremmer takes this further, arguing that global fragmentation has not occurred through the multiplication of poles, but rather through the multiplication of orders. He identifies three overlapping orders: Global Security Order – Unipolar, led by the United States; Global Economic Order – Multipolar, involving actors like the U.S., China, the EU, and Japan; Digital Order – An emerging system led not by states, but by powerful tech corporations. In contrast, the realist school maintains that states remain the main actors in international politics, even under conditions of globalisation and diffusion. Realists attribute changes in international order to power transitions—the cyclical rise and fall of hegemons. Structural realists have long debated the potential decline of American hegemony, asking whether the end of U.S. dominance will merely replace the hegemon or transform the very order it created. Fareed Zakaria also raises this question in the context of a possible post-American world. The Russian perspective, shared by many Kremlin officials and scholars, sees the post-Cold War international order as unipolar, dominated by the U.S. Russia claims its mission is to promote multipolarity, which implies not only challenging American dominance but also changing the international legal norms established under U.S. leadership—especially the principle of territorial integrity, which Russia disputes. While the idea of American unipolarity may reflect ideological bias more than reality, Russia’s efforts to establish an alternative order, supported by states like China and North Korea, raise global concern. Despite differences in theoretical perspectives, all agree on the inevitability of change in the international order. However, the causes, actors, and outcomes remain contested. Several pressing questions emerge: Is the transformation of the international order primarily driven by power diffusion, or does the Russia-Ukraine war accelerate it—Europe's most significant conflict since World War II? Is it a natural result of U.S. decline and China's rise? Will the U.S., in prioritising national interests, itself contribute to changing the order it once led? Among emerging powers (EU, China, Russia), which will succeed in achieving their strategic goals—preserving or altering the current order? Should we still speak of a single international order, or recognise the existence of multiple, overlapping orders? And crucially, is the principle of border inviolability, a core tenet of post-WWII international law, now changing—potentially triggering further global conflict? In this paper, we approach power diffusion as a defining condition of our time—an established reality that is transforming the international order. We view the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war not as the cause of this transformation, but rather as a catalyst for it. While power transitions are familiar and their outcomes historically predictable, power diffusion introduces new and unpredictable dynamics. One analogy helps clarify this: under power diffusion, warfare has already evolved into hybrid wars, where distinctions between war and peace are blurred. Similarly, peace itself has become hybrid, where outcomes often resemble surrender more than negotiated stability. We propose that the same logic applies to global order. The result is not a new, alternative order, but rather the hybridisation of the existing order. In this hybrid order, the nature of power and the rules of international engagement become increasingly ambiguous. Although we disagree with realists on the causes of change, we accept some of their ideas about consequences: in a hybrid order, there will be clear winners and losers; the role of states will grow; and new security threats will compel states to revert to realistic policies based on national interests.