"Three No's" Principle: China's Policy Toward North Korea's Nuclear Program

Abstract

Chinese leaders and senior officials have repeatedly emphasized that nuclear non-proliferation on the Korean Peninsula is a key regional interest for China. At the same time, China remains North Korea's principal economic, military, and political ally. Thus, at first glance, Beijing would seem to possess sufficient leverage to pressure Pyongyang into abandoning its nuclear ambitions. Nevertheless, North Korea has continued developing its nuclear program over several decades, and in 2023 even amended its constitution to define the development of nuclear weapons as essential to safeguarding the state's "right to existence." China's policy toward North Korea's nuclear program is shaped by broader strategic interests and regional security concerns. It is guided by the "Three No's" principle: no war, no chaos, and no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. These principles, which have underpinned China's approach for years, reflect Beijing's primary objective of maintaining regional stability while addressing the security challenges posed by North Korea's nuclear activities. The first of the three principles — "no war" — highlights China's determination to prevent any military conflict on the Korean Peninsula, given the risk that such a conflict could destabilize the entire East Asian region. From China's perspective, war would impose significant political and economic costs, regardless of the outcome. The second principle — "no chaos" — stems from Beijing's fear that excessive economic sanctions and external pressure could trigger the collapse of the North Korean regime. Such a collapse would threaten China's domestic stability, economic growth, and national security. In this context, China prioritizes the maintenance of the status quo, viewing the survival of the North Korean regime as preferable to the uncertainties that would follow its fall, including the potential for mass refugee flows into northeastern China and a stronger U.S. military presence near its borders. North Korea also serves as a strategic buffer state for China, further reinforcing Beijing's interest in preserving the current political order despite Pyongyang's unpredictable behaviour. While preventing war and instability remains China's top priority, Beijing also stresses the importance of a denuclearizedKorean Peninsula. Since the first nuclear crisis of the 1990s, China has consistently maintained that the elimination of nuclear weapons from the Peninsula is in its national interest. North Korea's ongoing nuclear tests have spurred military buildups among U.S. allies in the region and raised the prospect of nuclear proliferation in East Asia, outcomes that clearly run counter to China's strategic interests. Consequently, Beijing seeks to restrain North Korea's aggressive behaviour. However, given that North Korea's "Juche" ideology emphasises maximising independence from great powers, the unchecked expansion of Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities risks diminishing Chinese influence over its neighbour. Despite ongoing internal debates, China continues to advocate diplomatic and multilateral solutions to the North Korean nuclear issue. Beijing played a central role in the Six-Party Talks, supporting a framework whereby North Korea would denuclearize in exchange for security guarantees and economic assistance. However, the collapse of these talks and the continued advancement of North Korea's nuclear program have placed China in a difficult position. It must strike a balance between the need to ensure regime stability and growing international pressure to implement comprehensive sanctions against Pyongyang. Ultimately, China's policy toward North Korea reflects a careful balancing of security, diplomatic, and strategic priorities. The "Three No's" principle remains the foundation of Beijing's approach, yet it simultaneously complicates efforts to achieve North Korean denuclearization — a challenge that, over time, could pose even greater risks to China's regional and global interests.