Controversial External Influence on the South Caucasus States' Geopolitics

Abstract

It is a truism that any small country must seek the support of a larger and stronger state(s) in its foreign policy. But suppose the stronger state(s) do not have vested geopolitical or economic interests in the small country. In that case, formal support can lead to the opposite result instead of the desired one.  Several examples from the South Caucasus (formerly known as Transcaucasia until the end of the 20th century) are examined. During the "first independence" of the Transcaucasian republics in 1918-1920/21, their geopolitical vectors underwent several changes. The emergence of these republics was primarily due to the collapse of the Russian Empire, the long-term master of the area, during World War I. The new rulers of Russia, the Bolsheviks under Lenin, signed on 3 March1918 in Brest-Litovsk a separate treaty with the then-victorious on the eastern front "Central Powers". Russia was due to return to an ally of Germany, the Ottoman Empire, a part of Transcaucasia that it had gained after winning the 1877-1878 war with the latter. Meanwhile, the territory to be ceded to the Ottomans was claimed by nascent Georgian and Armenian states. The Ottoman and German Empires temporarily supplanted Russia as the hegemon in the area and, according to their vested interests, contributed to the formation of three states (the third being Azerbaijan) there. Germany intended to have a foothold in Georgia for further expansion in Asia, the Ottomans -- in Azerbaijan (with a desire of the Ottoman Pan-Turkism-leaning government to annex it completely). In contrast, Armenia was forced to accept being an Ottoman "protectorate." The hegemony of the "Central Powers" in Transcaucasia lasted for only a few months. They were defeated in World War I by the victorious Entente, which was expected by some to rule the area. However, the Entente, represented by the British Empire in Transcaucasia, soon lost interest in the latter, after the only asset worth attention there, Baku with its rich oilfields, had been captured by reemerging Russia in late April 1920. The British left Transcaucasia in July 1920. The absence of interest of the Western European powers permitted Bolshevik Russia to reoccupy Transcaucasia. A dramatic example of the formal support of a small state's territorial claims by great powers leading to the opposite result was the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres on August 10, 1920. The Republic of Armenia was promised almost tripling of its territory at the expense of Turkey, emerging from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. However, the result appeared to be the opposite of what was promised. Instead of augmenting its area, Armenia lost almost half of its original territory after being militarily defeated by Turkey. The great powers expressed their concern, as usual. Similar examples of geopolitical behaviour during the "second independence" of the South Caucasus states, following 1991, will be discussed.