The Perception of Russia and Russian-Georgian Relations by Georgian Population

Abstract

The perception of Russia in Georgian society has never been unambiguous. On the one hand, it was perceived as a protector of the Georgian nation from Persian and Ottoman aggression, a deterrent to the attacks of the North Caucasians, and a peacemaker. Russian propaganda often portrayed Russia as the savior of Georgia and the main guarantor of the survival of the Georgian people, a belief held by a significant portion of the Georgian population. On the other hand, Russia represented the country that abolished Georgia's statehood, suppressed the Georgian Church, and deprived the Georgian language of its status as the official state language. No conqueror had ever taken such actions in Georgian history. From this perspective, Russia emerged as the most dangerous invader and the worst enemy of the Georgian nation, for which not only the existence of the Georgian state but also the existence of the Georgian nation was completely unacceptable. Obviously, a significant portion of the Georgian population was aware of this. The negative sentiment toward Russia intensified after Georgia's independence, particularly due to the Russian occupation of Abkhazia and former South Ossetia, and especially following the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. Thus, it was interesting for us to determine, through sociological research, how the Georgian population perceives Russia and relations with Russian Federation. To this end, we conducted a survey in four regions of Georgia (Tbilisi, Mtskheta-Mtianeti, Kvemo Kartli, Javakheti). The survey included 1,200 respondents of both genders and all age groups living in both urban and rural areas. The vast majority of respondents in Tbilisi and Mtskheta-Mtianeti were ethnically Georgian and religiously Christian-Orthodox. In Kvemo Kartli, the majority were Muslim Azerbaijanis, and in Javakheti, Armenians and followers of the Armenian Church. The study was conducted in the summer of 2022, with participation from five master's and bachelor's students and two doctoral students from the TSU International Relations Department. The general conclusion drawn from the study on the Georgian population's view of Russia and Russia-Georgia relations is that the majority holds a negative attitude towards Russia, perceiving it as an enemy and considering it the main threat due to its imperial ambitions. They are against Georgia reestablishing diplomatic relations with Russia and fostering intensive economic ties until the country is completely de-occupied. The majority also believes that Russia's aggression towards Georgia in 2008 was driven by its imperialist goals and the punishment of Saakashvili's government for its pro-Western political orientation. The negative attitude towards Russia, its politics, and Georgia's relations with Russia is particularly pronounced among young people, individuals with higher education, urban populations, and female respondents. However, the most significant differences are seen in regional, ethnic and religious terms. While almost 3/4 of Georgian respondents in Tbilisi hold a negative attitude towards Russia, and up to 2/3 in Mtskheta-Mtianeti, only 1/3 of Azerbaijanians in Kvemo Kartli share this sentiment. Among ethnic Armenians of Javakheti region, less than 1/10 do so. Additionally, 2/3 of the Javakheti population consider Russia to be a friendly or neutral state to Georgia, a stark contrast to the less than 5% in Tbilisi. Similar patterns emerge in assessing relations between Russia and Georgia. Approximately half of all respondents believe that Georgia should not restore diplomatic relations with Russia until complete de-occupation, with 2/3 of Tbilisi respondents supporting this stance, compared to only 12% in Javakheti. Furthermore, while 7% of Tbilisi residents favor the unconditional restoration of diplomatic relations, this figure exceeds 70% in Javakheti. In terms of interpreting Russia's aggression in Georgia in 2008, 85% of Tbilisi residents attribute it to Russia's imperialist goals, while only 3.5% believe Russia was compelled to take such action. In Javakheti, these two indicators are equal at 23.5%. Throughout these findings, the Azerbaijani population of Kvemo Kartli occupies an intermediate position between the responses of the ethnic Georgian respondents from Tbilisi and Armenians from Javakheti. This suggests that part of the Kvemo Kartli population evaluates Russia from the perspective of Azerbaijan, while the Javakheti population does so from the perspective of Armenia. Otherwise, such a discrepancy among the main ethnic groups would be challenging to explain. This result underscores a significant political challenge and highlights the need to bolster the integration process. In conclusion, it is noteworthy that the political events occurring in the two years following the survey (particularly Azerbaijan's establishment of control over Karabakh and Russia's stance towards these events) likely altered the Armenian population's perception of Russia in a negative direction, while the Azerbaijani population's attitude towards Russia has become more positive.