environment and society

Lobbying Regulation in European Countries

Mariana Kevkhishvili — 2025-12-23

This paper reviews the practice of lobbying regulation in European countries that have adopted laws regulating lobbying activities or operate under a code of ethics.

Lobbying is an integral part of a healthy democracy and is closely connected to universal values such as freedom of speech and the right to petition the government. Ethical and transparent lobbying contributes to the development of policies and the improvement of decision-making processes by providing legislators and decision-makers with knowledge and expertise, particularly on technical matters.

In Europe, lobbying regulation aims to increase transparency and accountability in decision-making processes.

This paper examines various regulatory models in Belgium — mandatory registration for lobbyists at the federal level; France — mandatory lobbyist registration and a code of conduct; Germany — mandatory lobbyist registry since 2022; Italy — some regulations exist, mainly at the regional level; Ireland — strong and transparent lobbying regulation; Lithuania — mandatory registration and strict transparency requirements; Slovenia — robust lobbying legislation; Poland — specific lobbying regulation law in force since 2005; the Netherlands — voluntary registration, though there is ongoing discussion about mandatory registration; Austria — a lobbying registry and regulations since 2013; the United Kingdom — the "Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014"; Spain — some regional regulations (e.g., Catalonia), but a weak national system; and Portugal — new lobbying regulations adopted in 2019.

Additionally, Georgia is one of the first countries in Europe to adopt a specific act regulating lobbying activities — the "Law on Lobbying Activities."

This law was the first comprehensive act within the European legal system regulating lobbying.

The article aims to provide a comparative analysis of lobbying regulation practices in Europe and assess the effectiveness of these regulations.

The primary research question is: How do lobbying regulation models vary among European countries, and to what extent do they ensure transparency?

The paper argues that although legislative acts exist in the countries mentioned, the current lobbying environment often fails to meet the standards of effectiveness and transparency.

This is mainly due to two interconnected, though theoretically distinct, problems: first, the definitions of lobbying and lobbyists.

Current legal definitions do not fully capture the realities of lobbying activities, thereby harming the transparency and effectiveness of the regulations.

Second, a crucial determinant of the effectiveness of lobbying regulations is the enforcement mechanism.

Without strict formal enforcement mechanisms, laws have little impact on lobbyist behaviour and may ultimately prove ineffective.

New regulations must be accompanied by effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, as well as supervisory bodies with the authority to enforce these rules.

In conclusion, European countries still perform poorly when measured against international standards and best practices in lobbying regulation.

According to research findings, the average quality of regulatory systems among 19 countries and EU institutions is only 31 per cent, indicating that most are significantly unprepared to counter undue influence.

Despite the general trend toward stricter lobbying regulations, significant differences persist among countries in terms of mandatory registration, sanctioning mechanisms, and enforcement practices.

We conclude that, despite some progress, lobbying regulation in Europe remains a dynamic process that requires continuous improvement to ensure the balance of interests, protect democratic values, and maintain the legitimacy of political processes.

Power Diffusion and the Hybridization of International Order

Gvantsa Abdaladze — 2025-12-23

Some schools of International Relations (IR) theory view international politics as a multi-actor process. Among these, several theorists emphasise power diffusion as a central feature of digital globalisation. Joseph Nye highlights how this diffusion leads to an unprecedented decentralisation of power and alters the logic of international order. Ian Bremmer takes this further, arguing that global fragmentation has not occurred through the multiplication of poles, but rather through the multiplication of orders. He identifies three overlapping orders:

Global Security Order – Unipolar, led by the United States;
Global Economic Order – Multipolar, involving actors like the U.S., China, the EU, and Japan;
Digital Order – An emerging system led not by states, but by powerful tech corporations.

In contrast, the realist school maintains that states remain the main actors in international politics, even under conditions of globalisation and diffusion. Realists attribute changes in international order to power transitions—the cyclical rise and fall of hegemons. Structural realists have long debated the potential decline of American hegemony, asking whether the end of U.S. dominance will merely replace the hegemon or transform the very order it created. Fareed Zakaria also raises this question in the context of a possible post-American world.

The Russian perspective, shared by many Kremlin officials and scholars, sees the post-Cold War international order as unipolar, dominated by the U.S. Russia claims its mission is to promote multipolarity, which implies not only challenging American dominance but also changing the international legal norms established under U.S. leadership—especially the principle of territorial integrity, which Russia disputes. While the idea of American unipolarity may reflect ideological bias more than reality, Russia’s efforts to establish an alternative order, supported by states like China and North Korea, raise global concern.

Despite differences in theoretical perspectives, all agree on the inevitability of change in the international order. However, the causes, actors, and outcomes remain contested. Several pressing questions emerge:

Is the transformation of the international order primarily driven by power diffusion, or does the Russia-Ukraine war accelerate it—Europe's most significant conflict since World War II? Is it a natural result of U.S. decline and China's rise? Will the U.S., in prioritising national interests, itself contribute to changing the order it once led? Among emerging powers (EU, China, Russia), which will succeed in achieving their strategic goals—preserving or altering the current order? Should we still speak of a single international order, or recognise the existence of multiple, overlapping orders? And crucially, is the principle of border inviolability, a core tenet of post-WWII international law, now changing—potentially triggering further global conflict?

In this paper, we approach power diffusion as a defining condition of our time—an established reality that is transforming the international order. We view the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war not as the cause of this transformation, but rather as a catalyst for it. While power transitions are familiar and their outcomes historically predictable, power diffusion introduces new and unpredictable dynamics.

One analogy helps clarify this: under power diffusion, warfare has already evolved into hybrid wars, where distinctions between war and peace are blurred. Similarly, peace itself has become hybrid, where outcomes often resemble surrender more than negotiated stability.

We propose that the same logic applies to global order. The result is not a new, alternative order, but rather the hybridisation of the existing order. In this hybrid order, the nature of power and the rules of international engagement become increasingly ambiguous.

Although we disagree with realists on the causes of change, we accept some of their ideas about consequences: in a hybrid order, there will be clear winners and losers; the role of states will grow; and new security threats will compel states to revert to realistic policies based on national interests.

Art as a Source of Disinformation Content

Gül Ünlü — 2025-12-23

The Wider Black Sea Region and EU Security Threats After the War in Ukraine

Pikria Asanishvili — 2025-12-23

Before the war in Ukraine, European countries viewed the Black Sea region as a crossroads connecting Europe and Asia. The EU recognized the importance of the Black Sea area for connectivity, energy security, and regional development. It serves as a maritime link between Europe and the Caucasus and is a crucial component of the Middle Corridor—a multimodal trade route linking China to Europe through Central Asia and the South Caucasus. However, there was no clearly established strategy or vision regarding the “Post-Soviet Black Sea” region, particularly concerning security.

The Black Sea region includes two EU and NATO member states (Bulgaria and Romania), one NATO member state (Turkey), and six post-Soviet states: Georgia, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. Georgia and Ukraine have consistently expressed their desire to join the EU and are seen as the most pro-Western countries in the post-Soviet area. Despite the EU's enlargement to the west of the Black Sea, the European Union did not consider its political engagement with Georgia and Ukraine through the lens of security challenges. This was primarily because security issues were primarily addressed by NATO, in which most EU states are aligned. Additionally, before the war in Ukraine, the EU did not perceive Russia as a security threat.

Following the war in Ukraine and especially during the second term of President Donald Trump in the United States, European states dramatically altered their views on European security, which also resulted in a shift in perception of the so-called “Post-Soviet Black Sea region” as part of European security.

This paper examines the EU's relations with the post-Soviet Black Sea states before 2022 and discusses the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and its eastern dimension, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) projects, within institutional frameworks. It will analyze how the EU's attitude toward this region changed after the war in Ukraine and how the internal and external circumstances of the ongoing conflict have reconceptualized European security threats stemming from Russia.

The aim of this paper is to analyze how perceptions of European security have evolved since the war in Ukraine and to what extent the Black Sea region has become an integral part of European security following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

The research questions include:

- How has Russia’s war in Ukraine affected the EU’s security concerns?

- What role does the Wider Black Sea region play in the rethinking of the EU's security strategy?

This paper contributes to the ongoing discourse on security cooperation in the Black Sea region by providing a realistic and independent assessment of key challenges. It offers insights into the strategic outlook of key participants, illuminating the complexities of security and political developments in the region.

Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation

Guguli Magradze — 2025-12-23

In academic circles studying conflicts, the term "conflict resolution" has been the primary term for many years, used by both scholars and politicians. However, the term "transformation" evokes mixed reactions. For some, it seems overly loaded; for others, it appears excessively idealistic or even fantastical, suggesting a completely new era.

Authors who advocate for the term "transformation" view it as a precise, scientifically justifiable, and clearly articulated vision of relevant processes. Transformation represents an effort towards constructive change, which encompasses and goes beyond merely solving specific problems. It is grounded in two verifiable realities: conflict is a normal part of human relationships, and it serves as a force for change and progress.

If someone unfamiliar with conflict-related issues were to ask, "What is conflict?" we could explain it using a concept akin to conflict topography, akin to a topographic map depicting the peaks and valleys of our conflicts. The peaks represent the significant challenges we face in conflicts, often focusing on the most immediate issues. We define these peaks as the most pressing concerns in the conflict's content. In contrast, the valleys symbolize failures, the inability to negotiate satisfactory solutions, and the overarching landscape—a general representation of our relationship patterns, which can sometimes seem vague and distant. Just as it is difficult to grasp the entire mountain range when ascending a specific peak, this map illustrates our tendency to approach conflicts. We invest energy in addressing existing problems to alleviate the pain and anxiety associated with conflicts, often overlooking the broader context of the conflict.

Our objective is to demonstrate how the transformative approach addresses these tendencies and how it differs from the traditional perspective of conflict resolution.

Types of Georgian Nationalism on the First Stage of Its History (19th Century)

Zurab Davitashvili — 2025-12-23

The history of Georgian nationalism begins in the 1860s and is associated primarily with the name of Ilia Chavchavadze and other “Tergdaleulebi.” Due to various historical and political reasons, Georgian nationalism developed several distinctive features, among which the following are particularly noteworthy:

1)Georgians were a rare exception among the peoples of the Russian Empire in that they had their own statehood at the time of their incorporation into Russia. Thus, joining the empire meant the loss of their statehood, independent church, official status of the Georgian language, and, in effect, their national identity. Accordingly, the ultimate goal of Georgian nationalism was to achieve political independence and restore a sovereign state. Therefore, Georgian nationalism was, in essence, a liberation nationalism.

2) As a result of historical and political developments, Georgia ceased to be a unified state after the 15th century. It entered the Russian Empire as a collection of separate kingdoms and principalities. This situation considerably weakened the overall Georgian national consciousness. It posed a serious threat of national disintegration, where individual sub-ethnic and ethnographic groups might have evolved into separate peoples—especially since this was the direction promoted by official Russian policy. Consequently, one of the most important objectives of Georgian nationalism was to unify the nation and strengthen a shared Georgian national identity. Thus, Georgian nationalism was essentially a unifying nationalism.

3) The consolidation of the Georgian nation and the restoration of its independence would have set a dangerous precedent for the Russian Empire, potentially inspiring other subject peoples to pursue their own independence. As a result, the Russian authorities, who already considered Georgians (along with Poles) to be among the empire’s least reliable subjects, fiercely resisted any manifestation of Georgian nationalism. From the Russian Empire's perspective, Georgian nationalism, which served as the ideology of the Georgian national liberation movement, was viewed as a destructive, separatist form of mini-nationalism.

4) Recognising the realities of their situation, the leaders of the Georgian national liberation movement understood that demanding political independence outright would be both dangerous and unattainable in the early stages. Instead, they prioritised the spiritual unification of the Georgian nation, which required the development of a standardised literary Georgian language, the growth of the Georgian press and theatre, the widespread promotion of literacy, and the establishment of schools. Early Georgian nationalism, therefore, took shape as a form of cultural nationalism.

5) Alongside cultural goals, one of the important aims of Georgian nationalism was to improve the material conditions of the Georgian people and to develop a national bourgeoisie. The fact that economic control in Georgia was largely in the hands of the Armenian bourgeoisie. At the same time, the Georgian third estate was small and weak, had a profoundly negative impact on Georgian society. As a result, Georgian national figures made every effort to persuade the population to abandon its traditional feudal mentality and embrace commerce and entrepreneurship. Thus, in addition to cultural nationalism, Georgian nationalism also represented a form of economic nationalism.

6) Georgian nationalists had to struggle not only against the Russian authorities and the imperial press but also against segments of the Georgian aristocracy that were gripped by national nihilism. They even denied their ethnic identity, as well as against the leftist intelligentsia who championed internationalist ideologies and largely ignored national concerns. The latter group propagated the idea—often successfully—that national problems would naturally resolve themselves within a unified Russian state once social issues were addressed. Georgian nationalism opposed such ideas and thus came to represent an anti-cosmopolitan ideology.

7) Georgian nationalism was not directed against any particular people. The struggle against the Russian Empire did not translate into hatred toward the Russian people, just as the socioeconomic dominance of the Armenian bourgeoisie did not evolve into anti-Armenian sentiment. Georgian nationalism has never questioned the rights of ethnic minorities residing within the territory of Georgia. No one ever advocated for their deportation, dispersal, or forced assimilation, nor was there opposition to their preservation of language, culture, religion, and traditions. Ethnic minorities were never denied the right to education in their native language or to establish national press, theatre, and other cultural institutions. Therefore, despite its ethnic character, Georgian nationalism was a liberal, democratic nationalism.

These features of Georgian nationalism persisted in later periods, although their character sometimes changed depending on historical circumstances. At certain stages, nationalism took on a more aggressive form. Nevertheless, a significant portion of the Georgian population still adheres to the principles of liberal-democratic nationalism today.

Social Networks and the Backsliding of Democracy

Marina Muskhelishvili — 2025-12-23

Since the 2000s, numerous countries, including both liberal and electoral democracies, have experienced a decline in democracy, which in some instances has led to the collapse of democratic systems. This decline is characterized by several evolutionary dynamics: an increase in political polarization, growing control by rulers over their political parties and government branches (especially parliament), and legislative changes that weaken or even dismantle the legal and constitutional foundations of liberal democracy (S. Haggard, R. Kaufman, 2021). Georgia can also be categorized as a country experiencing democratic deterioration (V-Dem, 2025).

Similar to the Third Wave of democratization, this trend of democratic backsliding is global in nature; thus, some factors contributing to it are shared across borders and transcend individual countries.

Several theoretical perspectives can help us understand the backsliding of democracy. According to Huntington, democratization occurs in waves— each rise is followed by a setback or retreat (Huntington, 1991). Thus, the current developments are not unprecedented. As in previous waves, not all countries will maintain the gains achieved during the Third Wave of democratization. A contemporary interpretation of Carl Polanyi's work also emphasizes the wave-like nature of social dynamics: the rise of market liberalism triggers counter-movements, including fascism and communism, which oppose the values and institutions of prior eras (Polanyi, 2000; Burawoy, 2020).

The earlier Marxist paradigm offers a different causal perspective on this process. The Third Wave of democratization aligns historically with the information revolution, the creation of new technologies, and the emergence of new social communication structures. New technologies, particularly the Internet, significantly impact both economic and political processes, disrupting previously established institutions, including democracy, and paving the way for the emergence of new systems.

The effects of television and, later, the Internet on political systems have been the focus of considerable research (Habermas, 1991; Keane, 2013). In particular, scholars question the extent to which television contributed to the crisis of representative democracy and how social networks induced polarization and populism.

This paper examines the impact of social networks (specifically, Facebook) on the process of democratic decline (polarization, concentration of power, authoritarian collapse) within the Georgian context. According to Castells (2024), “Social media do not create political and ideological polarization; the roots of such polarization lie within societal conflicts. However, they exacerbate and broaden this polarization by using the digital public sphere as an amplifier for uncivil ideological confrontations.” Political messages that circulate in self-communication spaces tend to be more effective and popular when they are based on common sense rather than rational thought. Waisbord (2019) notes, “Social media offer unlimited opportunities for political discourse that are unbound by the standards of decency and respect traditionally upheld by quality or elite news media.” Various counter-rational political ideologies and communication strategies emerge within this space.

The spread of self-communication gives rise to a new media economy, which facilitates new methods and channels of political influence, including personalized “echo chambers” and the fragmentation of civic public space into radicalized extremes.

Using Georgia as a case study, this paper will explore various forms of polarization: preference polarization (pluralistic competition), agenda polarization (populism), and the stigmatization and dehumanization of social groups (leading to authoritarian collapse). Each type of polarization is accompanied by specific discursive ethics, both among political actors and within civil society.

Analyzing the Georgian example reveals that the structural transformation of political communication strongly affects the political system. As society's potential for protest mobilization increases, the system's ability to maintain constitutional order diminishes. In a context of radicalized confrontation, violence may become a rational means to maintain or seize power. The constitutional order, which previously played a crucial role in stabilizing political institutions during the era of liberal democracy, is now facing a legitimacy crisis.

Governance by the Famous:“ The Case of Georgia

Giorgi Melikidze — 2025-12-23

There are two main types of leaders in political science: formal and informal. A formal leader is someone who has responsibilities due to their official position, while an informal leader is a respected figure in society without any official duties. Social capital accumulated outside the political sphere can be effectively used for political purposes. Notably, during the pre-election period, the electorate tends to show more trust in informal leaders. Because informal leaders do not have political responsibilities, they are often in a favorable position. Their involvement in politics is particularly evident in times of weak ideological competition, when they compensate for the lack of ideological debate through their leadership. This shift makes politics more person-centered and less accountable to ideology. During pre-election periods, assembling party lists featuring well-known figures is a proven strategy that mobilizes an unstable electorate and secures their votes. This approach is especially effective in volatile electoral conditions.

What do we mean by ideological competition, and why is it so important? Ideological competition and programmatic differences between parties foster pluralism. The one-party rule during the Soviet era relied on maintaining a supportive intelligentsia, necessary for pseudo-legitimacy within society. Post-Soviet hybrid regimes also actively engaged the intelligentsia and celebrities to mobilize the electorate. This unity among citizens serves as support for the government, while for the average voter, it creates a behavioral pattern.

The term "intelligentsia" originates from Latin and means "benevolence." In the Soviet Union, the term referred to individuals engaged in intellectual labor. It was first used in its modern sense in Poland during the 1840s. Pascal provides a simpler definition: "intellectuals who discuss and critique various aspects of public life" (Pascal and Sirinelli, 2002). The term "celebrity" comes from the English language, deriving from the Latin word "celebritas," which means fame. Wright Mills's work "The Power Elite" (1956) is the first study to discuss "celebrities" in a sociopolitical context. According to Mills, the elite is not composed of extraordinary individuals but rather is formed by the positions that these individuals occupy, which gives them special influence. He suggests that the average citizen in modern society is subject to manipulation. Archeri (2020) argues that the involvement of celebrities can harm the democratic political process, citing their influence on public opinion, especially when they lack the necessary expertise.

The purpose of our study was to determine the role of weak ideological competition in the involvement of informal leaders in politics. We based our research on Marshall’s (2014) theory of celebrity influence, which posits that celebrities are individuals who outwardly promote (false) values and actively shape political, economic, and social life. Our hypothesis is that weak ideological competition leads to the involvement of informal leaders in politics. We explored the roles of both intelligentsia and celebrities in the political process. To conduct this research, we employed a qualitative method, specifically focus groups. The participants were selected non-probabilistically and purposefully, with one group consisting of individuals aged twenty to thirty-nine, and another group consisting of individuals aged forty to sixty.

Our findings indicate that individuals who lived during the Soviet period tend to view the role of the intelligentsia in the political process positively. In contrast, the new generation is more critical of the involvement of famous individuals in politics, believing that such involvement harms the democratic process. Participants from both focus groups agreed that prominent figures are leveraged by political parties, particularly when ideological competition is weak. In these cases, a celebrity serves as a reference point, using their trustworthiness to influence the electorate for political gain.

Power Configuration and Democratization Dynamics in Post-Soviet Georgia

Tornike Chivadze — 2025-12-23

In recent decades, a profound crisis of representative democracy has become evident in the democratic world, including traditional Western countries. Georgia's case warrants special analysis as the general crisis of democracy here is complicated by local post-Soviet specifics. To deeply understand these intricacies and the country's political dynamics, we can employ two influential theoretical frameworks: Michael Mann's theory of sources of power and Charles Tilly's analysis of the relationship between state capabilities and levels of democracy.

Michael Mann, in his fundamental work "The Sources of Social Power," argues that social life and historical development are shaped not by a single dominant factor, but by the interaction of four main, interconnected, yet analytically distinct sources of power. These sources are ideological (control of meanings and norms), economic (control of production and resources), military (control of organized coercion), and political (control of centralized governance, primarily through the state). According to Mann, the relative importance and interaction of these four sources vary historically, and their specific configuration determines the structure and developmental trajectory of a given society.

Charles Tilly, particularly in his works on state formation and democratization, focuses on two key but independent dimensions: state capacity—the state's actual ability to implement policy, mobilize resources, and maintain a monopoly on violence—and the level of democracy—the degree to which state actions are subject to broad, equal, protected, and mutually binding consultations with citizens. For Tilly, it is important to note that increasing state capacity does not automatically result in deepening democracy.

Examining Georgia's post-Soviet history through this theoretical framework reveals how the dynamics of power sources and the uneven development of state capabilities and democracy have led to the current crisis. Immediately upon gaining independence, several factors emerged that distinguished the Georgian political landscape from the European one: the absence of a tradition of mass, ideologically structured parties, the personalistic nature of politics, the dominance of project-based NGO sectors instead of strong, autonomous interest groups (such as trade unions), and a centralized tradition of governance. Additionally, the social structure was characterized by massive deindustrialization, economic transformation, high unemployment, and the near non-existence of strong, autonomous workers' organizations. This made it impossible to form a unified working class as a political subject, a key force for democracy in the West. Simultaneously, the middle class was fragmented and largely dependent on external or internal (often state) resources, which hindered its opportunities for collective action and autonomous organization. Critically, it is the organizational weakness and fragmentation of these two broad social strata—the working class and the middle class—that prevents the formation of effective coalitions between them. Historically, such inter-class alliances have played a decisive role in democratization processes in other countries. Their absence or weakness in Georgia seriously undermines the prospects for democratic consolidation and contributes to the maintenance of elite, non-representative politics.

Under these conditions, the struggle for power began, characterized by constant fluctuations among Mann's four sources. In the early years of independence, ideological power was dominant, although the political, economic, and military bases were critically weak. Consequently, state capabilities (in Tilly's terms) were extremely low, and the level of democracy rapidly declined. Following civil conflict, Shevardnadze came to power in a chaotic situation marked by fragmented paramilitary forces. This period saw political power almost entirely replaced by decentralized coercion, further weakening state capabilities and nullifying democratic processes. From the mid-1990s onwards, a gradual confrontation with this legacy began, along with the formalization of political power. State capabilities and the formal level of democracy slowly improved, but both remained low, as economic power largely continued to operate informally.

Between 2004 and 2012, there was a dramatic concentration of political and ideological power, accompanied by a sharp increase in state capabilities (according to Tilly). Economic power also grew, although it was often subject to political control, indicating a complex synthesis. Despite this increase in state capacity, the quality of democracy substantially declined. This exemplifies Tilly's divergence: an increase in state capacity occurring alongside weakening democracy.

After 2012, the state capabilities achieved in the previous period were maintained and, in some areas, improved. However, the configuration of power shifted again, with a growing influence of economic power, particularly capital associated with the ruling elite.

The use of digital technologies for propaganda by Caucasian jihadist movements

Giorgi Omsarashvili — 2025-12-23

The report examines the use of digital technologies, particularly internet resources and social platforms, by Caucasian jihadist and terrorist organizations. It focuses on the ideological propaganda conducted by these groups online, the formation of "online jamaats," the recruitment of new members, and the organization and management of terrorist activities.

As digital technologies have developed, jihadist organizations have increasingly adopted and integrated them into their operations. Notably, various multilingual online publications, such as Dabiq and Inspire, have been utilized to promote the organization’s ideological vision, educate supporters, and mobilize them.

To understand the use of digital technologies by jihadists in the Caucasus region, it is crucial to examine the period of the Russo-Chechen wars when the use of modern technologies in the information war intensified. In 1999, before the start of the Second Chechen War, the Center for Strategic Research and Political Technologies, operating under the Ministry of Information and Press of the separatist Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, established the website www.kavkazcenter.com. This site operated in Russian, Turkish, Arabic, and English, positioning itself as an independent international Islamic internet agency.

The significance of internet resources for Caucasian jihadist organizations escalated with the onset of the Second Chechen War, during which some Chechen separatist forces began transforming into a jihadist movement. KavkazCenter became a tool for North Caucasian radical Islamists to disseminate ideas about establishing Sharia law in the region and forming a unified "Caucasian Islamic State." In the early 2000s, alongside the formation of "combat jamaats" in the North Caucasian republics, the website worked to popularize jihadist fighters online and conducted ideological propaganda through articles, studies, audio lectures, and video addresses from Caucasian radical Islamist leaders.

These efforts aimed to create new identity constructs, analyzing events through a jihadist religious-ideological lens, rejecting Caucasian nationalism, and consolidating religious identity to liberate from Russian colonialism. The propaganda portrayed not only the Russian military and security forces as enemies, but also individuals within the administrations and judicial systems of the North Caucasian republics, as well as representatives of traditional Islamic currents, who were labeled as collaborators.

Subsequently, the site's administration activated other local websites under its control, covering the armed activities of jihadist groups in Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachay-Cherkessia. Concurrently, internet forums became active, systematically conducting religious propaganda and recruiting young people.

KavkazCenter aimed to attract young Caucasian Muslims, particularly since the internet was especially popular among the younger generation, and worked effectively to create a virtual unified "Caucasian Islamic State." From its founding until 2007, the agency significantly contributed to the ideological groundwork for the creation of the "Caucasus Emirate." After this period, there was a notable increase in the use of social networks for terrorist purposes.

The research also explores propaganda and recruitment activities conducted on social networks by jihadist movements following the outbreak of hostilities in Syria in 2011. Specific examples include internet calls urging supporters to migrate with their families to territories controlled by jihadist organizations, resulting in thousands of people from the Caucasus region migrating to Syria and Iraq to perform the so-called "hijrah" after being radicalized. The study analyzes groups formed on Russian- and Georgian-language internet resources and social platforms.

Additionally, examples of how social platforms have been used to recruit, instruct, and engage "lone wolves" in terrorist activities and attacks are discussed.

Finally, the presentation addresses the economic aspects, focusing on the use of digital technologies—such as cryptocurrency—for covert financing of jihadist organizations and fund transfer. It also considers the potential use of the darknet for obtaining necessary resources, including weapons and military equipment.

The National Council and the Adoption of the State Coat of Arms of the Democratic Republic of Georgia

Tamar Orjonikidze — 2025-12-23

The research was carried out within the framework of the Shota Rustaveli National Science Foundation of Georgia Grant Project “The Beginning of the Contemporary Georgian Parliamentarianism: The National Council of Georgia-The Parliament of Georgia”. Grant Code: FR-23-2950

The report examines the discussion that took place over several months (June-September 1918) regarding the development of the State Coat of Arms of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. The discussion commenced following Georgia’s declaration of independence on May 26, 1918, when the need to create Georgian banknotes—referred to as Georgian bonds—was introduced to the agenda. The State Coat of Arms was intended to be featured on the banknotes. The discussion surrounding this matter sparked significant disagreement and was ultimately resolved on September 17, 1918.

The main method used during the research is the content analysis of documents (of the materials of the National Council shorthand records and press). During the ongoing discussion about the coat of arms, despite differences of opinion, two main points of view emerged: a large part of the leading political force, the Social Democratic Party, supported the depiction of a chained Amiran, freeing himself, on the Coat of Arms of Georgia. Opposite it was Tetri Girogi with Seven Rays, which was supported by experts invited to discuss the issue.

The report outlines the principal arguments presented by both sides to support their respective positions and to counter opposing viewpoints. During the discussion of the issue, the history of the creation of state coats of arms was touched upon, and two types of argumentation were also identified: ideological (regarding the chained Amiran as a revolutionary symbol) and historical (regarding Tetri Giorgi).

The proposal to declare the chained Amiran as the state coat of arms was put forward by Irakli Tsereteli, a prominent figure in the Social Democratic Party, and was supported by the party's leader, Noe Zhordania. According to Irakli Tsereteli, “When we give Amirani's expression to our Coat of Arms, the spiritual aspiration of the democratic part of our entire people and its current situation will be reflected there.” However, there was no unity of opinion in the Social Democratic Party on this issue.

The speech of Ivane Javakhishvili at the August 5, 1918, session of the special commission created to develop the Coat of Arms was of decisive importance for resolving the issue of the Coat of Arms (the commission included about twenty members - Niko Nikoladze, Ivane Javakhishvili, Ioseb Imedashvili, Grigol Diasamidze, Shalva Meskhishvili, Irakli Tsereteli, Noe Zhordania, Samson Pirtskhalava). Ivane Javakhishvili, as an expert, participated in the creation of the Coat of Arms of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. Ivane Javakhishvili proposed that ”Tetri Giorgi” be adopted as the Coat of Arms of the Georgian state, arguing that this choice would be the most appropriate. According to Commission Chairman Konstantine Makashvili, “At this meeting, the commission received a comprehensive and well-substantiated report from Professor Javakhishvili. Following a brief discussion, it was unanimously decided that the Georgian coat of arms should feature Tetri Giorgi with seven rays.”

The matter was ultimately settled on September 17, 1918, during the 39th session of the National Council. At the session, debate once again arose over the design of the State Coat of Arms—whether it should depict the chained Amiran or Tetri Giorgi with seven rays. During the vote, the Social Democratic fraction allowed its members to vote according to their own views. It can be said that this decision stemmed from the fact that the majority of the party did not support the position of the party leaders on recognising Chained Amiran as a Coat of Arms.

The voting results reflected the prevailing sentiment in the National Council: 33 members supported the declaration of Tetri Giorgi as the Coat of Arms of Georgia, 17 were opposed, and two abstained. Only 16 deputies supported the adoption of the chained Amiran as the State Coat of Arms, while 34 voted against it. A crucial decision for the state was made correctly by a majority of the votes. As a result, Tetri Giorgi with seven rays was adopted as the State Coat of Arms of the Democratic Republic of Georgia.

Urban Blue Economy and the Future of Coastal Cities: The Case of Batumi

Valerian Melikidze — 2025-12-23

The urban blue economy serves as an integrated framework for sustainable development and social inclusion, presenting new opportunities for modern cities, especially those located along coastal areas. This approach emphasizes not only the efficient use of natural resources but also the enhancement of urban life quality, ecological resilience, and social justice.

Batumi, a city on the shores of the Black Sea, stands out as a key case study. Over the past two decades, the city has experienced rapid urban growth, but this expansion has come with significant challenges. These include the fragmentation of physical and social spaces, the degradation of coastal ecosystems, threats to cultural heritage, and a lack of long-term sustainability planning.

The urban transformation of Batumi has primarily been driven by investment-led, tourism-focused, and infrastructure-heavy strategies, which have profoundly changed the city’s spatial and socio-economic landscape. Unfortunately, this development model often neglects the needs of local communities, principles of social equity, and long-term ecological considerations.

In this context, applying the urban blue economy—focused on protecting marine ecosystems, integrating green and blue spaces, promoting responsible water governance, developing innovative infrastructure, and implementing citizen-centered planning—provides a promising pathway to a more inclusive and sustainable urban future for Batumi.

This study explores Batumi's major urban development trends through the lens of the urban blue economy. It traces the city’s spatial transformation through key historical phases, from Soviet-era planning to post-socialist transition and the recent wave of rapid urban expansion. The analysis reveals the geographic, social, and economic trajectories that have shaped Batumi’s contemporary urban identity and illustrates how various historical approaches to urban development have affected the city’s spatial structure and the perception of its coastal zone.

Ultimately, the paper offers an analytical framework to assess the outcomes of specific policies and understand the broader dynamics driving Batumi’s urban evolution.

The Impact of Technologies on Shaping the World Order

Gela Tsaava — 2025-12-23

Technology is a significant factor influencing relations between nations, alongside wars and economic shifts. It serves as a vital tool for promoting economic development and national security.

Historically, technological advancements initiated the Industrial Revolution, which laid the groundwork for the modern international system. Industrialized nations that embraced technology amassed significant economic and military power, establishing dominance over less developed regions and effectively creating a hierarchy among nations.

In the modern era, technological advancements have dramatically transformed communication, leading to improved well-being and social order. Modern technological processes have also facilitated the production of essential resources. The European Union (EU) has been actively involved in co-financing research and investments to promote these developments. However, the EU's focus diverges considerably from the approaches taken by the United States and China.

Specifically, the EU seeks to establish a technological level playing field through partnerships in research and investment co-financing. It aims to define the rules of the global tech landscape via international tech norms, standards, and regulations. In contrast, the EU's emphasis on multilateralism and technological independence significantly differs from the unilateral, state-centric approaches pursued by the United States and China, which prioritize technological dominance.

Technology plays an essential role in shaping the modern world by fostering new data and resource centers that impact fundamental economic opportunities. Its evolution has been crucial in breaking down trade barriers and facilitating cross-cultural communication. The technology landscape is undeniably shaping the new world order.

We believe that advancements in technology will define the 21st century. The United States, China, and the European Union are at the forefront of global technological development, each pursuing technological superiority for reasons of national security and economic strength.

However, it is important to note that the United States remains a leader in basic sciences. Major companies in both the U.S. and EU dominate additional digital platform technologies. Technological advancements in military, economic, and cultural areas have significantly altered the dynamics of modern geopolitics.

The development of artificial intelligence, in particular, has enabled countries to modernize their military arsenals. State-backed technology organizations benefit from ongoing investments aimed at developing advanced military systems. Future standards for major technologies like artificial intelligence, semiconductors, telecommunications, and computing infrastructure will influence stock markets for decades.

Global competition among superpowers is intensifying due to rapid technological advances in military capabilities. Nations are vying for superiority on land, sea, air, space, as well as in emerging fields such as biotechnological warfare. The technologies that have the most significant economic impact worldwide are those that revolutionize industries and lifestyles. Technological giants like Apple and Google have successfully transformed industries, often disrupting local market players with their innovation.

Ultimately, in this information age, technological progress has spurred the advancement and transformation of both the economy and society. Technology has swiftly become a source of immense potential and power. As a result, perceptions of security have changed dramatically, altering the nature of warfare in fundamental ways. The rise of new technologies has also led to new forms of security risks, ethical dilemmas, and considerations.

The United States' New Policy for a Technological Future

Tornike Zedelashvili — 2025-12-23

The United States of America is currently actively working on developing innovations and advancements in various technological fields. It is the number one country in the world in this regard and is trying to maintain its leadership. We can highlight the main issues on which the Donald Trump administration is actively working in the technological direction: strengthening high-tech production, introducing artificial intelligence and quantum computing systems, andensuring environmental sustainability. In this case, priority is given to utilising innovations to address challenges such as climate change, energy efficiency, and healthcare.

Experts note that cooperation between the public and private sectors is crucial for the success of this vision. Private companies are the primary source of innovation, and the role of the state is to provide institutional support and strategic guidance. For example, the partnership includes funding new research centres that focus on creating high-tech and innovative technological materials, ensuring energy efficiency and global sustainability.

Additionally, artificial intelligence is a leading force in the technological development of the United States. Artificial intelligence enables the automation of industrial processes, enhances data analysis, and drives the generation of innovations. Artificial intelligence can also play a transformative role in education, where new algorithms will help students improve their learning process, and teachers will no longer need to perform administrative tasks, as artificial intelligence will automatically analyse these tasks.

It is known that the United States government is working on the development of environmentally friendly technologies, such as the use of solar and wind energy. Various initiatives include the creation of eco-cities, where only eco-friendly technologies are used and waste is recycled in new, efficient ways.

The United States of America aims to equip future generations with the necessary skills and knowledge to become innovators and leaders in technological fields, utilising new technologies. This means not only strengthening science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, but also supporting a broad range of arts and humanities subjects so that students can develop interdisciplinary approaches. Thus, the new policy of the United States for a technological future aims not only to advance the country's economic and social progress but also to stimulate the global development of technologies.

The Geography of Artificial Intelligence: The Spatial Configuration of Technological Power

Tamar Bagratia — 2025-12-23

This paper investigates the geographical distribution of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and its implications for global technological inequality. AI has transcended the boundaries of a mere technological innovation and emerged as a pivotal driver of global economic and political power. Its development is influenced by geographically differentiated factors, including infrastructural resources, state policies, levels of investment, and the availability of human capital. Drawing on international indices and data (such as the AI Readiness Index and the Global AI Index), this paper examines the spatial logic of AI deployment and highlights the regional disparities that define divergent opportunities and challenges for countries at different levels of economic development.

Today, AI no longer solely resides within the domain of science and technology but has become a key element in global competition, with its development and implementation heavily dependent on geographical factors such as infrastructure, the availability of financial and human resources, governmental policies, and the cooperation between the private sector and academic institutions. The growing significance of AI is evident in energy consumption projections: by 2030, data centres are expected to account for up to 8% of the United States' total energy consumption.

The global dissemination of AI remains uneven, contributing to geographical inequality. Countries like China and the United Arab Emirates adopt unique national strategies to accelerate AI deployment, whereas many African nations continue to face considerable infrastructural and resource-based challenges.

According to the 2025 AI Index by Stanford University, despite the global increase in optimism, regional disparities persist. Populations in China (83%), Indonesia (80%), and Thailand (77%) exhibit the highest levels of optimism toward AI. In comparison, traditionally sceptical countries such as Germany (+10%), France (+10%), and Canada (+8%) have seen notable increases in positive perceptions since 2022. The United Kingdom (+8%) and the United States have witnessed a rise of 4%. Overall, the majority of populations demonstrate a favourable outlook toward AI.

The study employs a comparative methodology based on various international indices (AI Readiness Index, Global AI Index, AI Talent Index), alongside global economic and technological reports (e.g., WEF, McKinsey), and indicators that analyse the geographical distribution of AI patents, investment flows, and the concentration of skilled human capital, among other factors.

Through the analysis of geographical structures, three categories of countries are identified: AI leaders (e.g., the United States, China), regional powers (e.g., India, Israel, South Korea), and peripheral nations that remain largely excluded from the global AI development process. This classification emphasises how geopolitical forces shape the formation of technological innovation centres and highlights the challenges of achieving technological equality in a structurally unequal global landscape.

The field of AI geography is becoming increasingly important. AI geography refers to the geographical aspects of the development and application of AI systems, as well as their social, economic, and political impacts within and across countries, the integration of countries or regions, the concentration of infrastructure and resources, and the dynamics of research and investment.

Notably, Oxford University has initiated a research project examining the political geography of AI infrastructure, with a particular focus on the global distribution of "hyperscale" cloud systems and the role of states in their development.

The paper concludes that a comprehensive understanding of AI’s geographical characteristics is a necessary condition for ensuring a just, sustainable, and ethically governed technological future. The uneven nature of this process presents not only a technical challenge but also a broader global crisis relating to political imbalance, social justice, and ecological sustainability, all of which demand the activation of spatial approaches to address.

Studying AI geography is a crucial step toward shaping a technological future grounded in global justice, ethical standards, and sustainable development. A nuanced understanding of spatial inequalities is essential not only for identifying economic and political advantages but also for ensuring that international collaboration is founded on fairness and inclusivity. In addition to geographical and infrastructural factors, this study emphasises the significance of cultural and linguistic barriers on AI development. The multilingual adaptation of technological systems, the integration of cultural norms, and responsiveness to local needs shape how AI technologies are received at the regional level. These factors are closely intertwined with local labour market structures, educational systems, and the distribution of digital competencies, collectively contributing to the formation of a geographical map that defines the social dimensions of AI.

The Ideological Foundations of Russia’s Expansionist Policy in Russian Political Philosophy and Concepts

Aleksandre Melikidze — 2025-12-23

The research topic involves analysing the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. For 70 years, the Soviet Union, together with the United States, shaped the international agenda. Over several decades, the state that had held the status of a superpower lost most of its territories in 1991, relinquished its spheres of influence, and, having been a superpower, the Soviet Union's legal successor, the Russian Federation, became a secondary player on the international stage. Even today, the majority of Russian Federation citizens "lament" the Soviet Union’s loss, and conspiratorial theories about the West’splans to dismantle the USSR continue to emerge. Most of the population still views the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a great mistake. One reason for this nostalgic attitude is that Russia, the Soviet Union’s legal successor, deliberately avoids addressing the objective reasons for the dissolution, such as the dominance of gerontocracy, an ideologised and resource-dependent economy, unsuccessful foreign interventions, and the funding of these interventions (the Afghan War), as well as the free financial and military assistance provided to the socialist bloc. Russia’s current political elite benefits from the romanticising of the Soviet Union, which prevents the necessity for democratic changes from entering the public agenda. Creating the image of an enemy is an easier path, consolidating the nation around its leader.

In an article published on December 30, 1999, titled "Russia at the Millennium's Crossroad," Putin clearly asserted:"Russia was and will remain a great state." He outlined the primary contours of his governance in the article: "A strong state for the Russian people is not an anomaly" (Putin, V. 1999). A sense of national revival and the return to former greatness emerged within society.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing political and social vacuum of the 1990s, Putin began to fill this void by appealing to national interests and pride. In the 2000 Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept, Russia explicitly defined its zone of privileged interests. For the first time, dissatisfaction with the economic and forceful dominance of the USA and the growing trend of creating a unipolar world structure was openly stated. The concept declared Russia as a major Eurasian superpower. The primary area of interest identified in the concept was the development of a good-neighbourly strategic partnership with the CIS states, emphasising the importance of considering Russia's interests in these countries, including the rights of Russian populations within them (Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept, 2000).

In 2001, Putin symbolically reinstated the Soviet anthem. On May 16, 2003, in a message to the Federal Assembly, Putin again declared the post-Soviet space as a zone of strategic interest (Message to the Federal Assembly, 2001). In 2005, he referred to the dissolution of the Soviet Union as "the greatest catastrophe of the century" (Message to the Federal Assembly, 2005). Russia’s political establishment could not accept the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the formation of independent states from its former republics. As political scientist Belkovsky wrote in an article published on January 19, 2004, in Komsomolskaya Pravda, "Our nation has a single fate – imperial" (Belkovsky, S. 2004).

In 2008, Medvedev declared the post-Soviet space as Russia's zone of privileged interests. In the same year, Russia’sforeign policy concept emphasised Russia’s negative attitude toward NATO's expansion, particularly regarding Ukraine and Georgia’s plans to join NATO, as well as NATO's military infrastructure approaching Russia’s borders.

This topic remains relevant, as Putin’s Russia has not freed itself from imperial ambitions, which directly threaten the territorial integrity and sovereignty of neighbouring states. This is evident in cases such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Putin effectively uses the policy of creating an enemy, where, for some reason, everyone is against Russia, everyone wants to defeat it, and any legal measures or actions by post-Soviet countries aimed at limiting Russian influence are deemed Russophobia. Russia also manages to use external interventions to conceal its internal problems.

In August 2008, before the war, and in 2014, before the annexation of Crimea, despite a sharp fall in oil prices and a challenging socio-economic situation, Putin’s approval rating surged after these interventions, even though the socio-economic conditions did not fundamentally change.

In this context, an in-depth study of Russia’s foreign policy in the post-Soviet space is essential, as Russia is the only state actively using all possible mechanisms to reassert influence over the “near abroad,” and is the only country capable of unilaterally changing the political map of its neighbouring states.

In many cases, the West fails to assess Putin's policies properly. While geopolitics has lost significance in the West, Putin’s Russia acts precisely in geopolitical terms, grounding its foreign policy on the balance of power and "privileged interest zones." Putin’s geopolitical pragmatism can be seen as counter-revolutionary and revisionist, aiming to reassess the results of the 1990s "end of history" and restore Russia’s lost positions on the global stage, directly affecting the territorial integrity and independence of post-Soviet states. Therefore, for these countries, the greatest existential threat today comes from Russia’s postmodern empire and its expansionist foreign policy, which enjoys full support among the Russian population (as seen in Putin's popularity after the annexation of Crimea and the Russia-Georgia war).

Research novelty: The research does not limit itself to addressing the issue from a single perspective. It also explores the problem’s cause-and-effect relationships in a historical retrospective. The study identifies and analyses the prerequisites and factors that significantly influenced the regional political and economic agenda in the post-Soviet space. The originality of the research does not lie in its thematic focus, as the real relevance of the issue to post-Soviet states has already drawn the attention of many scholars. However, its originality lies in the attempt to approach the issue from all sides, aiming to eliminate any bias.

Methodology: The research methodology is qualitative. Primary and secondary sources were analysed. To analyse Russia's foreign policy and explore the theoretical foundations of its expansionist policies, an in-depth study was conducted on the Russian Federation's national security concepts, national security strategies, and foreign policy doctrines.

Secondary sources were utilised to elucidate the ideological foundations that underpin Russia's political culture and its current expansionist policies in the post-Soviet space. For this purpose, the research drew on the fundamental works of scholars who follow Russian geopolitical concepts, including Slavophilism and Eurasianism. The focus was on theses that help readers find a "logical" explanation for contemporary Russian foreign policy and its attitude towards the West. Additionally, foreign academic works specifically addressing the post-Soviet space and analysing Russia's interests in this region were examined.

Challenges of developing welfare state policy in post-Soviet Georgia

Gia Zhorzholiani — 2025-12-23

The formation of welfare policies in the modern era was a response by the state to the social situation. As a result of the establishment of capitalism, a social structure emerged that was characterised by high economic inequality, tension, and confrontation between different social groups and classes.

On the one hand, the aspiration and struggle of subordinate social groups to improve their situation (both economically and politically), and on the other hand, the aspiration of the government to gain and maintain high legitimacy (respectively, to weaken existing confrontations and de-escalate conflicts), pushed the opposing social groups to make several compromises. It can be said that the institutionalisation of such compromises was expressed in the establishment of a normative and executive order of welfare policy. After World War II, the development of welfare policies in Western Europe and North America (later also in East Asia) intensified and expanded.

The resource base that allowed the state to implement a welfare policy was mainly created by tax policy, which gradually became more progressive and significantly increased state revenues compared to the pre-war period. Another critical factor was the growth of the state's role, as well as the dominance of Keynesian and “dirigist" economic policies in these countries, which was facilitated by both the wartime experience and the challenging post-war social and economic situation.

The sequence of processes of welfare policy formation was radically different in post-Soviet countries, including Georgia. While in the West, the establishment of capitalism preceded the formation of state welfare policy, in post-Soviet countries, on the contrary, the process of capitalism formation began under conditions of a broad welfare policy.

Soviet welfare policy was based on the principle that the state was practically the only proprietor, and all resources for implementing welfare policy were concentrated in the hands of the government. There was no other economic actor in society that could receive surplus profits to be used in satisfying social needs. Conditionally, the state can be imagined as the sole “capitalist” that would redistribute the created added value for the general welfare.

In the West, the primary source of resources for the welfare state was taxes paid by numerous economic actors based on their financial activities within society. In Soviet conditions, it was the state's own revenues.

Due to the establishment of capitalism in the post-Soviet conditions, the state was deprived of the economic resources that it previously possessed and used for welfare policies. The second reason, which extremely reduced state revenues, was the radical reduction of the economy in general, which was caused, on the one hand, by the complete collapse of the integrated Soviet economic system and the disruption of established production chains, and on the other hand, by the complete unpreparedness for the competition that arose as a result of the establishment of liberal trade regimes.

In the post-Soviet era, Western-style state revenue mechanisms have proven to be largely ineffective. The public moods and ideas that dominated in the 1990s bear more resemblance to the moods in Western capitalist societies, which were characteristic of the era of so-called primary capital accumulation and unregulated economy (laissez-faire), than to the contemporary (1980s-1990s) welfare state order. This was accompanied by a high level of distrust of the state, which was caused by the extreme delegitimisation of the Soviet state. Accordingly, these factors contributed to the negative attitude of public opinion and new economic actors (formed mainly through privatisation) towards taxes.

Both such public sentiments and weak, ineffective state institutions drastically reduced the state's tax revenues and, consequently, the necessary economic resources for implementing welfare policies. At the same time, paradoxically, public expectations for the state to implement welfare policies were high (a habit of the Soviet period). In contrast, the role and participation of society in public policy were neglected (again under the influence of Soviet tradition).

The contradictions and social conflicts characteristic of Western (capitalist) societies in the 19th and 20th centuries are now evident in post-communist societies, particularly in Georgia (poor-rich, property owners-propertyless), but in a different economic context (non-industrial, informational, high-tech, globalised), communication order, and cultural space.

Thus, the theories, approaches, and paradigms developed in the West require significant rethinking and can be used primarily as methodological tools for analysis, rather than as normative (from a scientific point of view) truths that explain the phenomenon under study.

Artificial Intelligence and the Security Dilemma

Vakhtang Maisaia — 2025-12-23

In the contemporary era, the rapid advancement of digital technologies has profoundly transformed almost every sphere of human activity. Among these innovations, Artificial Intelligence (AI) stands out as one of the most powerful and disruptive forces, reshaping social, economic, political, and security landscapes. Its growing adoption across multiple sectors has generated both unprecedented opportunities and significant challenges to global security.

The application of AI in international politics presents a dual reality: on the one hand, it strengthens national defence systems, enhances cybersecurity, and increases efficiency in conflict management and warfare. On the other hand, its uncontrolled dissemination and misuse by non-state actors may escalate global instability and create new transnational threats. Modern warfare strategies are rapidly evolving, undermining traditional practices such as formal declarations of war, thereby eroding the legitimacy of the existing international security architecture.

Our research aims to present and analyse the concept of the “security dilemma” associated with AI, exploring its impact within the framework of contemporary political science and interdisciplinary studies. To this end, desk research and analytical methods were employed, focusing on two central research questions:

What is the impact of Artificial Intelligence in the context of security?
How can AI be utilised to manage international risks and threats?

Findings indicate that the persistent efforts of states to enhance AI-driven military capabilities and to keep pace with potential adversaries contribute to the intensification of a new arms race. This dynamic creates a classical security dilemma, whereby attempts to strengthen one’s own security often undermine global stability. Consequently, fragile international institutions and rule-based security systems are becoming increasingly vulnerable.

Furthermore, global technological competition involves not only states but also malicious non-state actors who exploit AI for cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and transnational threats. Such developments shift the balance of power, necessitating the design of new strategies to maintain global security.

It is essential to emphasise that integrating AI into security policies requires a comprehensive understanding and synchronised actions. AI has the potential to serve as both a stabilising tool for peace and a catalyst for conflict escalation. Therefore, revisiting the global security architecture, strengthening international legal frameworks, and adopting pragmatic approaches are crucial.

In conclusion, Artificial Intelligence is no longer merely a technological innovation; it has become a transformative force in international politics and security systems. Its influence on the global order will only intensify, demanding collective, rational, and responsible actions from both states and the international community as a whole.

The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Academic Space: Integrity, Inequality, and Interdisciplinary Transformation

Tamar Vepkhvadze — 2025-12-23

The rapid development of generative artificial intelligence, particularly ChatGPT and similar language models, has led to significant changes in academic environments. These technologies transform teaching and learning practices, revolutionizing the entire academic ecosystem. Over the past two years, the dramatic increase in AI accessibility has forced higher education institutions to face unprecedented adaptation challenges.

By 2024, 83% of higher education institutions globally will have revised their policies in response to AI technologies. In developing countries like Georgia, AI integration is particularly complex due to existing structural challenges—limited resources, unequal digital access, and inconsistent educational policies. Nevertheless, AI adaptation presents a unique opportunity to overcome traditional barriers and create innovative models for education and research.

Research Aim and Objectives This study examines the impact of artificial intelligence on Georgia's higher education system, focusing on three interconnected aspects:

Academic Integrity - how AI changes traditional understanding of plagiarism, authorship, and intellectual labour, and how institutions should adapt to maintain ethical standards;
Digital Inequality - how unequal access to AI technologies affects existing social and institutional inequalities, and what strategies can reduce this inequality;
Interdisciplinary Transformation - how AI facilitates crossing disciplinary boundaries and creates new collaborative models.

The specific objectives are:

To analyze current practices and attitudes regarding AI usage among academic staff and students;

To identify patterns of AI access inequality across demographic groups and disciplines;

To assess AI's impact on interdisciplinary collaboration;

To analyze existing institutional policies related to AI;

To develop evidence-based recommendations for institutional policy.

Methodology

The study employs a mixed methods approach. The quantitative component included an online survey with 173 respondents (92 students and 81 academic staff) from various disciplines. The questionnaire consisted of 35 closed-ended and seven open-ended questions assessing AI usage practices, attitudes, barriers, and opportunities.

The qualitative component consisted of nine semi-structured interviews with university leadership, faculty deans, and program directors, focusing on institutional challenges and strategies related to the integration of AI.

To ensure data diversity, the study involved seven higher education institutions, four of which are located in the capital city and three in different regions. Respondent selection used stratified sampling to ensure representation from various disciplines, social groups, and institutional types.

Key Findings

Academic Integrity:

78% of academic staff report significant changes in teaching methods since AI emergence.

82% of students use AI for academic purposes, but only 31% disclose this to instructors.

67% believe existing plagiarism policies inadequately address AI challenges;

Most universities lack clearly articulated policies regarding the use of AI.

45% of academic staff lack sufficient training to understand ethical aspects of AI usage.

Digital Inequality:

Representatives of humanities disciplines use AI tools 43% less frequently than those in STEM fields;

Regional university students use AI 37% less than capital university students;

Low socioeconomic status students use premium AI services 52% less frequently;

57% of academic staff and 63% of students identify language barriers as hindrances to effective AI usage.

Interdisciplinary Transformation:

43% increase in interdisciplinary collaboration directly linked to AI use;

64% of academic staff note that AI tools help them understand concepts from other disciplines;

Interdisciplinary projects increased from 25 (2022) to 43 (2024), representing 72% growth;

Seventy-one per cent of students believe that AI promotes interdisciplinary thinking and problem-solving abilities.

Recommendations and Significance

Based on research findings, the paper presents ethical guidelines and policy recommendations aimed at maximizing the academic benefits of AI while minimizing risks:

Developing clear policies for AI usage that consider both disciplinary and institutional contexts;
Creating AI literacy programs for students and staff, with a focus on regional universities and humanities;
Implementing innovative assessment methods focused on critical thinking and creativity;
Developing strategies to reduce digital inequality, including expanding technology access and supporting native-language AI tools;
Promoting interdisciplinary programs and projects using AI to transcend disciplinary boundaries.

The study emphasises the critical importance of digital transformation in Georgia's higher education and provides a foundation for effective AI integration in academic environments.

The results are relevant not only for Georgia but also for other developing countries facing similar technological adaptation challenges.

Controversial External Influence on the South Caucasus States' Geopolitics

Revaz Gachechiladze — 2025-12-23

It is a truism that any small country must seek the support of a larger and stronger state(s) in its foreign policy. But suppose the stronger state(s) do not have vested geopolitical or economic interests in the small country. In that case, formal support can lead to the opposite result instead of the desired one. Several examples from the South Caucasus (formerly known as Transcaucasia until the end of the 20th century) are examined.

During the "first independence" of the Transcaucasian republics in 1918-1920/21, their geopolitical vectors underwent several changes. The emergence of these republics was primarily due to the collapse of the Russian Empire, the long-term master of the area, during World War I. The new rulers of Russia, the Bolsheviks under Lenin, signed on 3 March1918 in Brest-Litovsk a separate treaty with the then-victorious on the eastern front "Central Powers". Russia was due to return to an ally of Germany, the Ottoman Empire, a part of Transcaucasia that it had gained after winning the 1877-1878 war with the latter. Meanwhile, the territory to be ceded to the Ottomans was claimed by nascent Georgian and Armenian states.

The Ottoman and German Empires temporarily supplanted Russia as the hegemon in the area and, according to their vested interests, contributed to the formation of three states (the third being Azerbaijan) there. Germany intended to have a foothold in Georgia for further expansion in Asia, the Ottomans -- in Azerbaijan (with a desire of the Ottoman Pan-Turkism-leaning government to annex it completely). In contrast, Armenia was forced to accept being an Ottoman "protectorate."

The hegemony of the "Central Powers" in Transcaucasia lasted for only a few months. They were defeated in World War I by the victorious Entente, which was expected by some to rule the area. However, the Entente, represented by the British Empire in Transcaucasia, soon lost interest in the latter, after the only asset worth attention there, Baku with its rich oilfields, had been captured by reemerging Russia in late April 1920. The British left Transcaucasia in July 1920. The absence of interest of the Western European powers permitted Bolshevik Russia to reoccupy Transcaucasia.

A dramatic example of the formal support of a small state's territorial claims by great powers leading to the opposite result was the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres on August 10, 1920. The Republic of Armenia was promised almost tripling of its territory at the expense of Turkey, emerging from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. However, the result appeared to be the opposite of what was promised. Instead of augmenting its area, Armenia lost almost half of its original territory after being militarily defeated by Turkey. The great powers expressed their concern, as usual.

Similar examples of geopolitical behaviour during the "second independence" of the South Caucasus states, following 1991, will be discussed.

How New Strategic Communication Tactics are Reflected in the Media in the Context of China-US Competition: The Case of Generative AI Based 'Look What You Taxed US Through Video

Oğuz Kuş — 2025-12-23

The effects of generative artificial intelligence tools are felt in every aspect of daily life. The current political atmosphere, where economic, political and military competition is intensifying, it is observed that artificial intelligence tools are used by different countries for political discourse production and legitimacy building on a global scale. It was possible to encounter videos of country leaders created with deepfake technology, manipulative digital content produced with AI-supported systems integrated into bot farms, and highly realistic fake profiles and content that created with AI technology-based systems. These activities were often implicitly integrated into the hybrid communication efforts. However, the publication of the artificial intelligence-generated video clip titled “Look What You Taxed Us Through”, which was shared by the official social media accounts of China's official broadcasting channel, following the tariff hike decisions of the United States was a unique example. Because its circulation for international strategic communication purposes presents new dimensions from technolog-wise and discourse-wise. This significant example can be described as a new strategic communication move in the ongoing political and economic competition between the US and China. The fact that the video clip circulates messages critical of the US from the Chinese side on social networks makes artificial intelligence a tool for constructing new narratives and influencing existing perceptions in the inter-state political arena through emotional engineering.

The study aims to explore how the decisive role of video content generated with artificial intelligence technology in international strategic communication reflection in the media. At this point, the content shared by news channels on this topic will be systematically collected and analyzed using an inductive content analysis approach. In order to access the news content, the Google News search tab will be used with the keywords “Look What You Taxed Us Through”, which is the name of the video clip, and non-repetitive content will be included in the study.

While the main research question of the study is “How is video content on the theme of international strategic communication generated by artificial intelligence framed in news texts?”, the relationship between variables such as the profile of the platform that publishes the news, the tone of writing of the news, the way it is conveyed to the reader, how it is connected with other artificial intelligence technologies, how the issue of artificial intelligence is made sense of in general, and what kind of context is constructed about technology within the framework of the United States - China relations will also be discussed. In addition, the study will examine how the media perceives a key case involving the use of AI-generated content for strategic communication purposes. It is important to explore this case because “artificial intelligence” emerges as a new and important front in the battle for economic and political supremacy between the United States and China. In this context, the findings will also make it possible to realize a discussion on how the technological side of the competition between these two countries has developed.

Under the light of the findings, it is aimed to create a ground for discussing how artificial intelligence technologies are positioned in global competition, how the politicization of technology in the age of poly-crisis is tried to be made sense of, and how artificial intelligence can be positioned at the point of strategic communication. It will also enable the development of a perspective on how the technological side of the competetion between the United States and China is evolving. Finally, it will provide an opportunity for a multi-faceted discussion on how to prevent the erosion of truth in the shadow of international strategic communication wars and emerging technologies.

Public Opinion on the Rise of Spectacular, Sustainability-Oriented Large-Scale Projects in Astana and Baku

Suzanne Hariss-Brandts — 2025-12-23

This research draws from data collected through eight focus group discussions conducted in Astana, Kazakhstan, and Baku, Azerbaijan. It examines citizens' perceptions of megaprojects—both those that have been constructed and those that remain unbuilt—focusing on those aimed at sustainability within authoritarian contexts. The study addresses three interconnected questions: first, how do residents understand the roles of domestic and international governmental and non-governmental actors in urban development, particularly regarding unbuilt proposals? Second, how do residents perceive the connections between megaprojects, national image, and their countries' global reputations? Finally, how do citizens view the social and political implications of unbuilt megaprojects in their cities?

This topic is significant because megaprojects have historically supported nation-building, urban renewal, and real estate speculation. In the context of heightened global movement of capital, policies, and ideas, states embrace ambitious projects to symbolize prosperity and modernization, which often results in increasingly extravagant and technologically advanced designs. While some projects come to fruition, others are merely speculative and are referred to as "megaproject mirages"—projects that are too extravagant and costly to undertake yet still hold value as symbolic capital. These mirages significantly influence political economies and urban identities.

Current scholarship focuses on the high-risk nature of megaprojects but often overlooks the potential benefits of unbuilt initiatives. Such projects avoid prohibitive construction costs while still providing tangible financial and symbolic advantages. They enhance perceptions of host states as prosperous and functional, regardless of actual feasibility. Importantly, these proposals, even if unrealized, shape urban economies, cultural narratives, political dialogues, and public opinions.

Research on megaprojects has expanded significantly over the past decade, analyzing their various impacts. However, there is still insufficient attention given to the social, political, and economic roles of unbuilt projects. Additionally, much of the existing scholarship, largely stemming from Global North and South contexts, risks oversimplifying impacts and creating universal narratives. Furthermore, limited research addresses citizen perspectives on megaprojects, particularly regarding unrealized flagship developments.

Astana and Baku exemplify cases of large-scale speculative development in the Global East. Here, eco-branding strategically reconciles historical fossil-fuel economies with modern sustainability ideals, utilizing oil and gas wealth to reshape national images as environmentally conscious while promoting urban boosterism that benefits local elites. In these authoritarian settings, the promotion of eco-sustainable, energy-efficient lifestyles often substitutes for genuine democratic freedoms and transparency.

Notable unbuilt or incomplete projects include Baku's net-zero Zira Island, the artificial eco-archipelago Khazar Islands, Astana's Light Rail Transit (LRT) system, Tulip City, and the expansive Water Green Boulevard Dome—each featuring'ecological' branding. Despite their unfinished status, these projects have influenced local urban politics, public discourse, and international perceptions of their respective countries.

While urban development projects undeniably serve the interests of authoritarian elites, the outcomes are not solely determined by them; citizens still possess avenues for influence. The complex interactions among elites, societal actors, institutional structures, popular protests, and political-economic relationships significantly shape the outcomes of urban development. Therefore, a nuanced analysis is necessary to challenge overly simplistic dichotomies—such as state versus citizen or government versus ruling party—and to examine the potential role of civil society in the processes of democratization in urban development. Consequently, investigating citizen perceptions in megaproject research offers valuable insights into the political implications of megaproject mirages.

Polarity of the International System in Times of Change: A Proposed Model of Analysis

Marek Pietraś — 2025-12-23

Polarity is a key element in analyzing the structure of the international system (M. Kaplan, 1957). It links the concept of polyarchy with the global distribution of power as seen in previous approaches. The structure of this distribution of power serves as an independent variable, acting as a type of force field that influences state behavior. Different types of polarity result in distinct patterns of state interactions.

Russia's aggression towards Ukraine has accelerated changes in the global international system, definitively marking the end of the unipolar hegemony of the United States that emerged after the Cold War. This situation represents not a short-term crisis, but a permanent shift within the international system that signals the conclusion of the "inter-epoch" following the Cold War. The world has entered a new period of power redistribution, which will have significant consequences for the structure of polarity and the behavior of states.

The cognitive goals of this paper are threefold. First, it aims to reconstruct the evolution of thought regarding the polarity of the international system within the discipline of international relations, addressing the crucial question of its adequacy in light of accelerating changes in international realities. Second, it seeks to propose a new, dynamic approach to polarity—not simply viewing it in terms of relative excess power, which is characteristic of "billiard ball" models (a static, structural approach), but rather within the context of geopolitical strategy and the projection of states' potential (a dynamic approach). Third, it will analyze the geopolitical priorities of Russia, China, the United States, and the Global South.

The polarity of the international system refers to the structure of power distribution in a polyarchic, decentralized international context at any given moment in history. It is a crucial element in analyzing the process of change within the international system. (Neorealism: K. Waltz, 1979; M. Kaplan, 1957). Models of international system polarity include unipolar, bipolar, multipolar, and dopolar (R. Haass, 2008). The unipolar system was not anticipated; it was only analyzed after it emerged as a result of historical developments. We are currently witnessing a change in polarity, transitioning from a unipolar system to an unpredictable future.

Several relationships exist between polarity and the stability of the international system: 1) A bipolar system is considered more stable (K. Waltz, 1964; J. Mearsheimer); 2) A unipolar system is regarded as more stable (J. Ikenberry, W. Wohlforth, 1999); 3) A multipolar system is deemed more stable (K. Deutsch, D. Singer, 1964); and 4) A bi-multipolar system is viewed as optimal (R. Rosecrance, 1966).

Existing models of international system polarization tend to be static, focusing on the relative surplus of power, and single-level, emphasizing the concentration of power within the global system.

The proposed model is, first, dynamic and functionally oriented rather than solely structural. While it acknowledges the significance of surplus power, it also considers the geopolitical strategy (geopolitical rationality) of states, beyond just their power alone. Additionally, it addresses the evolving nature of power in international relations, incorporating elements of hard and soft power, the impact of interdependence on power usage, and the diffusion of power throughout the international system, including toward the Global South. Two decades ago, shifts in power centers were identified as moving from the West to the East; currently, we are also observing a shift from the North to the South.

Second, it is proposed to view the polarity of the international system as a two-level phenomenon, accounting for both the global international system and regional powers.

"Three No's" Principle: China's Policy Toward North Korea's Nuclear Program

Vakhtang Davitashvili — 2025-12-23

Chinese leaders and senior officials have repeatedly emphasized that nuclear non-proliferation on the Korean Peninsula is a key regional interest for China. At the same time, China remains North Korea's principal economic, military, and political ally. Thus, at first glance, Beijing would seem to possess sufficient leverage to pressure Pyongyang into abandoning its nuclear ambitions. Nevertheless, North Korea has continued developing its nuclear program over several decades, and in 2023 even amended its constitution to define the development of nuclear weapons as essential to safeguarding the state's "right to existence."

China's policy toward North Korea's nuclear program is shaped by broader strategic interests and regional security concerns. It is guided by the "Three No's" principle: no war, no chaos, and no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. These principles, which have underpinned China's approach for years, reflect Beijing's primary objective of maintaining regional stability while addressing the security challenges posed by North Korea's nuclear activities.

The first of the three principles — "no war" — highlights China's determination to prevent any military conflict on the Korean Peninsula, given the risk that such a conflict could destabilize the entire East Asian region. From China's perspective, war would impose significant political and economic costs, regardless of the outcome.

The second principle — "no chaos" — stems from Beijing's fear that excessive economic sanctions and external pressure could trigger the collapse of the North Korean regime. Such a collapse would threaten China's domestic stability, economic growth, and national security. In this context, China prioritizes the maintenance of the status quo, viewing the survival of the North Korean regime as preferable to the uncertainties that would follow its fall, including the potential for mass refugee flows into northeastern China and a stronger U.S. military presence near its borders. North Korea also serves as a strategic buffer state for China, further reinforcing Beijing's interest in preserving the current political order despite Pyongyang's unpredictable behaviour.

While preventing war and instability remains China's top priority, Beijing also stresses the importance of a denuclearizedKorean Peninsula. Since the first nuclear crisis of the 1990s, China has consistently maintained that the elimination of nuclear weapons from the Peninsula is in its national interest.

North Korea's ongoing nuclear tests have spurred military buildups among U.S. allies in the region and raised the prospect of nuclear proliferation in East Asia, outcomes that clearly run counter to China's strategic interests. Consequently, Beijing seeks to restrain North Korea's aggressive behaviour. However, given that North Korea's "Juche" ideology emphasises maximising independence from great powers, the unchecked expansion of Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities risks diminishing Chinese influence over its neighbour.

Despite ongoing internal debates, China continues to advocate diplomatic and multilateral solutions to the North Korean nuclear issue. Beijing played a central role in the Six-Party Talks, supporting a framework whereby North Korea would denuclearize in exchange for security guarantees and economic assistance. However, the collapse of these talks and the continued advancement of North Korea's nuclear program have placed China in a difficult position. It must strike a balance between the need to ensure regime stability and growing international pressure to implement comprehensive sanctions against Pyongyang.

Ultimately, China's policy toward North Korea reflects a careful balancing of security, diplomatic, and strategic priorities. The "Three No's" principle remains the foundation of Beijing's approach, yet it simultaneously complicates efforts to achieve North Korean denuclearization — a challenge that, over time, could pose even greater risks to China's regional and global interests.

The Georgian National Council and the Formation of the Party System of the Democratic Republic of Georgia

Malkhaz Matsaberidze — 2025-12-23

The research was carried out within the framework of the Shota Rustaveli National Science Foundation of Georgia Grant Project “The Beginning of the Contemporary Georgian Parliamentarianism: The National Council of Georgia - The Parliament of Georgia”. Grant Code: FR-23-2950

Research Topic - The report examines the role of the National Council of Georgia in shaping the party system of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. The National Council was established by the National Congress of Georgia (November 19-22, 1917). At the time of the convening of the National Congress, Georgia was part of the Russian state and in addition to Georgian itself, all-Russian political parties operated on its territory. The political parties that supported Georgia'sterritorial autonomy—and thus laid the groundwork for the restoration of the Georgian state—were included in the composition of the National Council, which the National Congress elected. The National Council included both Georgian political parties (Socialist Federalist Party of Georgia, Radical Democratic Peasants' Party of Georgia, National Democratic Party of Georgia, "Alioni" Group) and Georgian organizations of the All-Russian parties (Georgian fraction of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party, Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party).

The report highlights the further transformation of the National Council, noting its expanded composition and the inclusion of representatives from national minorities following the restoration of state independence. On October 8, 1918, the National Council was officially renamed the “Parliament of Georgia.”

Relevance and novelty - Researching the history of political parties in Georgia is a topical scientific task, and much remains to be done in this direction, both in terms of studying parties and publishing documents that reflect their activities.

The novelty of the report lies in its presentation of the National Council's role in shaping the party system of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. The foundation of the party system of the Democratic Republic of Georgia was established by the National Council, later known as the Parliament of Georgia. The parties that joined the National Council and initiated the restoration of Georgia’s statehood played a key role in laying the groundwork for the future state's party system, the subsequent development of which is connected to the activities of the Constituent Assembly of Georgia (1919-1921).

Research Method - To solve the chosen problem, the historical method has been employed, which involves studying the historical situation in Georgia at the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1919. A content analysis of documents related to the activities of the National Council/Parliament of Georgia was also conducted, primarily focusing on meetings of the National Council and materials from the periodical press that discussed the composition of the National Council/Parliament of Georgia and its transformation.

Conclusion - The initial composition of the National Council and its subsequent expansion were based on inter-party agreements rather than elections. Party representation was allocated according to the perceived level of influence of each party, with the Social Democratic Party holding the dominant position.

After the restoration of Georgia's independence, Georgian deputies of the Transcaucasian Sejm were included in the National Council, after which the council's composition increased from 66 to 88. Then, while maintaining the existing proportion between parties, the representation of parties increased, and the number of members of the National Council reached 121. By the law of September 13, 1918, the national councils of minorities residing in the territory of Georgia were given the right to elect 26 representatives. As a result, representatives of the Dashnaktsutyun and Armenian national parties entered the National Council.

Following Georgia’s declaration of independence, the Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries split from their All-Russian organisations to establish independent Georgian parties. As a result, the representation of the main parties in the National Council changed as follows:

	November, 1917	May 29, 1918	June, 1918
Social Democratic Party	28	51	68
Socialist Federalists	10	11	16
National Democrats	9	10	15
Socialist Revolutionaries	7	9	12
"Alioni" Group	4	4	5
Radical Democrats	1	1	3
Full composition of the National Council	66	88	121

The Constituent Assembly elections, on the one hand, revealed political entities that sought to participate in the electionsand establish themselves in the country's political landscape. On the other hand, they demonstrated the actual balance of power between the parties. Although the Constituent Assembly elections were held using a proportional system and a zero threshold, only representatives of the main parties entered the Constituent Assembly, with the Social Democratic Party dominating even more than it did in the Georgian National Council/Parliament of Georgia.

The study's results can be utilised for further research into the history of Georgian parties and the party system, as well as in educational contexts.

Features of the demographic situation in the regions of Georgia

Gia Kvinikadze — 2025-12-23

Relevance of the topic. The selection of the demographic situation in the regions of Georgia as the object of empirical research was determined by several reasons. In particular, a) significant disparities in the demographic situation between the regions of Georgia and b) the increase in the number of regions in the so-called depopulation regime and/or with the potential to transition to it.

Methodology and methods used. What factors determine the demographic characteristics of regions? This is a question that needs to be answered. Especially since in recent years, there has been a clear shortage of scientific research on the mentioned topic in Georgia. The study was based on the analysis of secondary sources (content analysis of official documents related to the demographic situation in the regions), the scientific literature on the issue under study, and information available in scientific electronic databases. The information base consisted of statistical data found in open sources of the National Statistics Office. According to the modern administrative-territorial division of Georgia, the geographical scope of the study encompasses all regions of Georgia (except for the temporarily occupied Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia regions), and the chronological framework spans the years 2012-2022. Statistical, cartographic, and geo-information systems (GIS), as well as content analysis and comparative analysis methods, were employed as the primary research methods. To study the demographic situation in the regions, 10 indicators were analyzed (general fertility rate, number of live births, number of stillbirths, general mortality rate, infant mortality rate, natural increase rate, marriage rate, average age of marriage, divorce rate, and physical population density). To better understand the issue, the demographic situation in the regions was studied separately at both the urban and rural levels, resulting in a classification of the regions according to the indicators above.

Research results and findings. The majority of Georgia's population resides in Tbilisi. In 2012, this figure accounted for 29.2% of the total population; in 2017, it increased to 30.7%; and by 2022, it had risen to 32.6%. After Tbilisi, the largest number of inhabitants was recorded in Imereti. The lowest figure in terms of population share was in Racha-Lechkhumi and Lower Svaneti. In 2012, the highest and nearly identical birth rates were recorded in Kvemo Kartli, Adjara, and Tbilisi. Between 2012 and 2017, the number of live births in Georgia's regions increased slightly. In Tbilisi, this rate was almost twice as high as in Imereti. Notably, in 2022, the number of live births decreased in all regions of Georgia (except Adjara) and fell below the 2012 level. A trend of decreasing stillbirths was observed in all regions of Georgia, except Tbilisi. In addition, between 2012 and 2017, the number of stillbirths in the regions, mainly in rural settlements, significantly exceeded that in urban settlements. Since 2022, the share of urban settlements has been increasing and is already ahead of rural settlements in Shida Kartli, Samtskhe-Javakheti, Imereti, and Adjara. There are no sharp changes in the general mortality rate in the regions of Georgia. High mortality rates were observed in Racha-Lechkhumi and Lower Svaneti. The dynamics of the infant mortality rate show a decreasing trend except for Mtskheta-Mtianeti. Except for Tbilisi, the natural increase in all regions increased until 2017.

Then a decreasing trend is observed. In all regions of Georgia, except Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti, a decrease in the marriage rate is observed. Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti are the only regions in Georgia where the marriage rate in 2022 was higher than in 2012. In 2012 and 2017, except for Adjara, the marriage rate was higher in cities than in rural areas in all regions. In 2022, the marriage rate in rural settlements increased and surpassed the urban settlement rates in Tbilisi, Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti, Shida Kartli, Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti. During the study period, a trend of increasing average age of married men was observed in all regions of Georgia. The average age of marriage among women was lower than that of men, although a growing trend was observed. For example, in Tbilisi, this indicator increased from 28.6 years to 32.3 years during the reporting period. During the study period, the divorce rate increased in all regions of Georgia. The largest increase was observed in the Imereti region. The urban population is largest after Tbilisi in Adjara (55-58%), while the smallest is in Racha-Lechkhumi and Lower Svaneti (21-24%). The highest population density is recorded in Tbilisi, where more than 2,000 people live per square kilometre. This figure is almost 20 times higher than the second-highest density region, Adjara.

Conclusion. Based on the identified trends, we can conclude that regional demographic differences can generally be explained by their level of urbanization and emigration (the analysis of which is beyond the scope of this study), which varies significantly by region. Tbilisi, Imereti, and Adjara are the most densely populated and urbanised regions, and they have relatively better demographic indicators (although Imereti does not fit into this trend). At the same time, a group of regions has been identified where the population is rapidly decreasing and approaching the depopulation stage. This trend is most noticeable in the high-mountainous regions, where the primary demographic indicators have deteriorated significantly.

Finally, the absence of data on interregional population flows and migration has complicated the presentation of a more or less complete demographic picture of the regions.

Demographic Processes in Georgia in the face of Global Challenges

Vazha Lortkipanidze — 2025-12-23

The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century witnessed a wealth of global challenges, which emerged primarily due to the lightning collapse of the Soviet Union (and, consequently, of the entire community of socialist countries), which was accompanied by severe economic and socio-political crises following the disruption of economicties between these countries.

As is well known, global challenges have arisen with varying degrees of intensity throughout human history. In ancient times, global challenges most often manifested themselves in the form of various infectious epidemics (not to mention such related problems as practically permanent wars and famines that claimed thousands of lives). It should not be forgotten that global challenges often manifest themselves in the form of natural disasters (droughts, floods, landslides, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, etc.). In short, global challenges ultimately manifest themselves in crises of various kinds (economic, political, military, natural disasters, etc.).

As of January 1, 2023, Georgia ranked 119th in terms of territory (69,700 square kilometres) among 241 countries worldwide, and 131st in terms of population, meaning that Georgia had only 0.046% of the world's population on that date.

The population of Georgia has been declining almost continuously since the 1990s, which can be particularly detrimental for the already small state. Moreover, maintaining the current demographic situation in Georgia for another 1-2 generations (50-60 years) may even lead to a demographic catastrophe, especially since Georgia still has unresolved border problems with all four countries bordering it (Azerbaijan, Turkey, the Russian Federation and Armenia).

This situation may, for example, have a substantial migratory impact on our country and even stimulate territorial claims from neighbouring countries. Thus, the continuation of the current trend of population decline will further exacerbate the problem of national security, and the persistence of this depopulation in Georgia may even lead to a deterioration of its geopolitical position.

Global challenges have a significant impact on demography (fertility, mortality, marriage, divorce, migration). In periods of economic crises, the production of goods can be realised later, when the crisis is over and the level of production increases. Still, they can in no way compensate for those unborn children and their descendants who could not be born due to the crisis. This is the reason for the deterioration of the demographic situation in the post-crisis period.

Thus, the main forms of manifestation of global challenges are: “demographic catastrophes” and „demographic crises“.

As is known, if a demographic catastrophe is primarily determined by a sharp and sometimes unexpected increase in mortality, the same cannot be said about a demographic crisis, which is usually caused by a decline in fertility. During the crisis, the mortality rate will either remain stable or increase only slightly. Quantitatively, a demographic catastrophe is characterised by pronounced depopulation processes resulting from a sharp increase in mortality. In contrast, during a demographic crisis, there is a significant decrease in natural increase due to a decline in fertility, which can reach negative values.

Considering all the above, it is interesting to examine the global issues that affect demographic processes in Georgia. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic in recent years (2020-2023) had a global character and claimed the lives of thousands of our compatriots, which, from the demographic point of view, meant a sharp increase in mortality.

Over the last 35 years, Georgia has experienced almost chronic depopulation, one of the manifestations of which is a significant population loss recorded from 1994 to 2024, amounting to -1,235.3 thousand people. This is an important and largely irretrievable loss for the already small population of Georgia.

One of the global demographic challenges for the modern world, including Georgia, is international migration, which has intensified in almost all countries. Georgia is no exception in this regard.

In addition, Georgia is characterised by a negative external migration balance unprecedented for the post-Soviet period, the persistence of which will make it even more challenging to maintain the country's demographic security for a long time. Therefore, it is necessary to adopt a long-term demographic policy in advance of Georgia's demographic development.

State Capture and Usurpation of Power in a Democratic Society

Alexandre Kukhianidze — 2025-12-23

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of democratic state institutions, the development of civil society, and the establishment of independent media. Until the late 1990s, political scientists most often published articles about the new wave of democratisation, without paying due attention to other processes hidden from the general public, related to the penetration of unscrupulous politicians, representatives of the secret services, and organised crime into power structures. As a result, there was an unfair redistribution of wealth, power, and control over human and financial resources. Using democracy as a tool, certain groups of people effectively seized state power in the states that emerged from the Soviet Union's ruins. Today, researchers call them criminal states, mafia states (or mafiocracies), gangster states, terrorist states, or fascist dictatorships. All of them are considered to be captured by groups of people who, hiding behind democratic rhetoric and utilising various technologies of power usurpation, seek to enrich themselves and ensure personal security at the expense of their nations.

Transparency International defines state capture as "a situation where powerful individuals, institutions, companies or groups inside or outside a country use corruption to shape the politics, legal environment and economy of a country for their own personal gain." State capture is considered here as a severe form of corruption that can cause long-term damage to a country striving for democratic development. Liz David-Barrett also argues that state capture is a form of systematic corruption. However, state capture, as a term, can extend beyond a form of corruption if it is considered a form of hybrid warfare unleashed by a foreign state.

Usurpers of power fear the consolidation of the political opposition and civil society within the country, so they use control over the state to split the opposition, weaken civil movements, discredit non-governmental organisations, and deprive the media of funding. Authoritarian or totalitarian control over the state and civil society is the logical conclusion of state seizure and usurpation of power.

The problem of state seizure is not a purely national issue. The usurpation of power inevitably requires the artificial polarisation of society into supporters and opponents of the regime, the search for internal and external enemies - agents (or agents of foreign influence) within the national state, and a global war party outside it. This not only discredits civil society at the national level but also lays the groundwork for the ideological justification that only the ruling party, an informal group of individuals, and their leader are the true defenders of state sovereignty. They position themselves as fighters for peace and defenders of their nation from the encroachments of destructive external forces.

In some instances, the issue of seizing power is linked to a hybrid war by a neighbouring state. The agents in this case may have enormous financial resources, engage in extensive patronage activities for many years, penetrate local society, build social capital, acquire influence, and, at the right moment, initiate political activity to win democratic elections. Methods such as populism, demagogy, and false election promises are integral components of hybrid warfare during election campaigns. Once the state power is captured through patronage and parasitism on democratic values, the agents begin a gradual usurpation of this power, consistently dismantling democracy and carrying out the instructions of the neighbouring state and its special services.

The consolidation and active engagement of democratic forces, as well as the combination of soft and hard power at the national and international levels, are the only alternatives to the seizure of state power and the usurpation of authority, capable of leading to victory in the confrontation with the advancing dictatorship.

Ideological Orientations, Selection Criteria, and “Rules of the Game” of Political Elites in Georgia

Avtandil Tukvadze — 2025-12-23

This article examines the ethnopolitical national-dissident elite of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the neo-nomenklatura elite of Eduard Shevardnadze, the pro-Western neoliberal-authoritarian elite under Mikheil Saakashvili, and the political elite of Bidzina Ivanishvili, which evolved from a moderate-liberal party into a right-wing conservative force.

We compare the ideological values, selection criteria, foreign policy orientations, and the "rules of the political game" of these various elites. The article emphasizes that in the Georgian political process, ideology and action programs receive less attention. Instead, the electorate often bases its choices primarily on the leader. Alongside the personalisation of political parties, there is a significant loyalty to the leader at the highest levels of government.

In the elite selection process, loyalty to the leader and the dominance of the principle of patrimonialism are the primary characteristics for recruiting the political elite, with variations only in the personalities of the leaders. In the absence of a democratic system for elite selection, professional qualifications rarely serve as criteria in Georgian political life. The study of elites in Georgia is only feasible through an altimetric method of research, which includes many individuals lacking managerial skills and elite values. This approach considers being in leadership positions as a defining feature of the political elite. Consequently, we can conclude that the failures in Georgia's modernization efforts are largely due to the ruling elite's low qualifications.

The negative impact of counter-elites, whose goal is to discredit the ruling government and seize power by force, also contributes to this situation. The concept of constructive opposition, as seen in developed democracies, is not applicable in Georgia. The "rules of the political game" have fostered a culture of mutual animosity, and the communicative vocabulary characteristic of democratic discourse is nearly absent between opposing parties. Neither the authorities nor the opposition has a coherent economic development strategy; ideological alignment is primarily dictated by foreign policy orientation, and both conservatism and liberalism are often used pejoratively.

Signs of a subordinate political culture are evident in the "rules of the political game." Neither side acknowledges any common national values. Disagreement exists regarding the country’s status, with the counter-elite advocating for European integration and liberal values, which often conflict with conservative Orthodox beliefs, traditional family values, and Georgian cultural heritage. The government, depending on its resources and aligning ideologically with the new U.S. administration (e.g., FARA, the ban on LGBT propaganda), hopes to gain support from Trump.

In contrast, the opposition, yearning for a coalitional government, has also conceded that the country may need to relinquish part of its sovereignty and hold early parliamentary elections with significant EU involvement. The non-governmental sector, opposition parties, and international actors demand these early elections, backed by financial and political support. The findings from the OSCE/ODIHR observation mission are frequently ignored, and rhetoric surrounding "Russian law" and family values is removed from the agenda.

Finally, despite the radical opposition present in the country, the "rules of the political game" indicate a trend towards the accumulation of democratic values. Over a hundred days of protests, neither side crossed a single red line, which contrasts sharply with the political processes that transpired under Gamsakhurdia and Saakashvili.

Reasons for the Formation of Student Protest Movements in Contemporary Georgia

Mariam Gelkhauri — 2025-12-23

The work was supported by Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, within the framework of the 2023 targeted grant. Project title: "Student Protest Movements in Georgia: Reasons, Types, Results (2016-2022)."

The formation and activism of student protest movements play a crucial role in state transformation, often acting as catalysts for broader societal change. "Student movements aim to bring about change, they express the concerns of the youth, and seek to make a difference in the world around them" (Tjhatra, 2022). Following the post-Soviet period, the crises in Georgia had a profound impact on the formation of society and its collective consciousness. Since 2011, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University has become a central hub for student protests, which later spread to other universities in the country. Students may unite around motivations such as institutional challenges, broader socio-political issues, or generational shifts (Lipset & Altbach, 1966). However, more often, protests are linked to complex internal university challenges faced by students.

Activism is an inherent part of student life at Tbilisi State University, and as societal and political changes unfold, the nature of student movements also evolves. In 2016, the student movement "Auditoria 115" (Mandaria, 2017) introduced a new and larger-scale form of protest. The movement was involved not only in protesting university-related issues but also in addressing state-level concerns. The relevance and novelty of student protests in Georgia were further emphasised by the formation of the "May Student Movement" in 2020 (Tarkhnishvili, 2022). The reasons for the formation of "Auditoria 115" and the "May Student Movement" vary, often reflecting both internal university challenges and external, state-level issues.

Given the significance of this issue in Georgia, this research aims to analyse the reasons behind the formation of contemporary student protest movements in the country. The research questions aim to determine: 1. What external factors (state, economic, social) influenced the formation of student movements, and 2. What internal university-related factors contributed to their formation? To explore this topic in depth, the analysis employs a combined approach that incorporates both qualitative and quantitative research methods. The first stage involved reviewing existing academic literature and secondary sources on the topic, followed by the analysis of primary data through in-depth interviews. A total of 20 interviews were conducted with purposively selected former or current members of both protest movements, using a semi-structured interview guide. The first part of the interviews focused on the reasons for joining the protest movements. For the primary factorial analysis, the study also utilises quantitative research methods to categorise the internal university-related and external government-related reasons for protest. The data were categorised and coded based on two indicators—coverage area and percentage—and analysed using MAXQDA software for content coding. The selection of these student movements was based on their scale ("Auditoria 115") and novelty ("May Student Movement").

For the study of the reasons behind the formation of student movements in Georgia, this research is grounded in Collective Identity Theory. This theory emphasises the shared identity and solidarity of participants in social movements. Collective identity is crucial in strengthening solidarity among group members, enabling them to pursue common goals despite individual differences. Alberto Melucci explains that shared experiences, goals, and dissatisfaction with certain issues foster the formation of collective identity. Collective identity plays a crucial role in mobilising students around common issues, such as dissatisfaction with educational policies, political repression, or social injustice. Shared student experiences, such as studying at the same university, overcoming similar challenges (e.g., increased tuition fees, lack of representation), or participating in collective actions (e.g., protests), contribute to the formation of a common student identity. Student movements often emerge in response to perceived injustice and unmet needs, which become the focal point of collective identity.

Furthermore, shared goals, such as political change, social justice, or educational reform, strengthen collective identity and give the movement a clear direction (Melucci, 1996). Melucci's explanation is directly applicable to the Georgian context, as seen in the cases of "Auditoria 115" and the "May Student Movement." In both instances, the groups coalesced around a shared objective, driven by a sense of injustice, which motivated participants from the same university to protest.

In light of the Georgian example, the academic study of contemporary student movements offers valuable insights from both theoretical and practical perspectives. The novelty of the topic arises from the relatively short history of student movements in Georgia and the limited academic literature on this subject in the Georgian context. Therefore, the analysis presented here is a valuable contribution to academic research, drawing on both an extensive review of academic literature and the analysis of secondary documents, as well as primary empirical data. The primary data, reflecting the perspectives of students directly involved in the protests, are particularly significant. From a theoretical standpoint, this article will contribute to future research by providing a distinct perspective on the subject. Practically, studying student movements can help state institutions develop appropriate policies for universities facing similar challenges. Moreover, this research will provide valuable insights for those interested in studying the experiences of student protests in Georgia and other post-Soviet countries. This work will also lay the foundation for a comparative analysis, allowing for comparisons between Georgia's student movements and similar experiences in other countries. As such, the research will contribute to the deepening of academic discourse on student movements in Georgia and will help integrate this topic into international studies, enriching it with new empirical data.

The Electoral Threshold and Democratic Representation: The Case of Georgia’s 2024 Parliamentary Elections

Natia Zedginidze — 2025-12-23

On October 26, 2024, Georgia held its regular parliamentary elections, which, for the first time since gaining independence, were conducted entirely under a proportional electoral system (ISFED, 2024). This reform aimed to strengthen political pluralism and encourage a culture of consensus within parliamentary processes (Sukhitashvili, 2024).

According to the Constitution of Georgia, Parliament comprises 150 members elected through a proportional system in a single nationwide constituency. Mandates are distributed only among those political parties that receive at least 5% of the valid votes. If the total number of distributed mandates does not reach 150, the remaining seats are allocated sequentially to the political subjects with the best results (Parliament of Georgia).

The choice of an electoral system is a sovereign right of the state. Each country has the autonomy to determine which electoral system and threshold best align with its historical and political context. Striking a balance between representation and governability is especially important during transitional periods and in conflict-prone environments (Tsintsadze, 2020).

The electoral threshold serves as a mechanism that sets the minimum share of votes a political party or coalition must receive to gain representation in the legislature. This mechanism is widespread in proportional electoral systems, as it promotes multi-partyism, facilitates the formation of stable majorities, and protects legislative bodies from excessive fragmentation, which could otherwise hinder or paralyse parliamentary activities. However, it is worth noting that, according to the Venice Commission, no electoral system can achieve full proportionality in practice (Micaela Del Monte, 2024).

Critics argue that electoral thresholds harm pluralism and artificially distort parliamentary representation. Moreover, to overcome the threshold, smaller political actors are often compelled to form artificial coalitions, which can ultimately leave voters of minor parties without effective political representation (Micaela Del Monte, 2024).

The electoral threshold has a significant impact on the realisation of voters' political will, the quality of elections, and the level of representation. In Georgia, this issue holds a central place in the country's political discourse. Ahead of the 2024 parliamentary elections, the debate over lowering the electoral threshold resurfaced. Some opposition parties argued that, for the sake of Georgia's pro-Western future, and better to reflect the real sentiments of society in the legislature and secure a multi-party parliament, it was crucial to lower the ruling party "Georgian Dream - Democratic Georgia's" electoral threshold from 5% to 2% ("Demand for Lowering the Electoral Threshold," 2024), which would also help reduce the country's political polarisation.

Conversely, some opponents maintained that parties seeking parliamentary representation should at least be able to surpass a 3% threshold. In addition, lowering the threshold posed certain risks, such as enabling the participation of potentially destructive forces with dubious funding sources (Kandelaki, 2022).

The ruling party argued that, given Georgia's political context, maintaining a 5% threshold was both rational and legitimate, ensuring a stable parliamentary majority. They also noted that a similar model operates in most EU countries (NEWSHUB, 2022).

The retention of the 5% threshold ahead of Georgia's 2024 parliamentary elections had a significant influence on the process of party consolidation. Political actors became increasingly focused on achieving electoral success and surpassing the threshold of winning. Consequently, coalitions were formed between political forces with differing ideological and value-based orientations.

These circumstances affected the nature of the electoral campaign and limited voters' ability to make conscious and genuinely free choices. Furthermore, when there is a high probability that a political party will fail to overcome the threshold, some voters refrain from supporting their preferred party and instead vote for a subject more likely to surpass the threshold, thus distorting the true reflection of the electorate's political will and undermining pluralism.

Moreover, when the votes cast for threshold-failing parties are effectively nullified, and as a result, parties that surpass the threshold receive a greater share of parliamentary mandates, it raises serious concerns about the fair reflection of voters' political will. It should also be noted that, within Georgia's political context, the prospects for new, idea-driven political forces to enter the legislature remain low.

Thus, this study seeks to address the following research questions:

What impact did the 5% electoral threshold have on parliamentary representation in Georgia's fully proportional 2024 parliamentary elections?
How did the loss of votes cast for threshold-failing parties affect political pluralism and the realisation of voters' political will in Georgia's 2024 parliamentary elections?
How does the 5% threshold limit the prospects for new political forces to achieve success in fully proportional parliamentary elections in Georgia?

This research aims to explore the impact of Georgia's 5% electoral threshold on political representation and the realisation of voters' political will, using the 2024 parliamentary elections as a case study. Furthermore, the research focuses on analysing the challenges associated with the loss of votes and the obstacles that impede the success of new political forces in the political arena.

The study will be based on an analysis of documents related to electoral matters. Specifically, it will examine the political and legal aspects of the electoral threshold, relevant legislative acts, and the coalition-building strategies of political parties. Reports published by international and local organisations regarding the elections will also be analysed.

Additionally, the study will utilise descriptive statistics to examine the effect of the electoral threshold on the distribution of votes and mandates among parties.

Understanding the Concept of Nation in Georgian Periodicals in 1893-1917

Nino Maisuradze — 2025-12-23

This work was supported by Shota Rustaveli National Science Foundation of Georgia (SRNSFG) [№ FR-24-17422]

This study examines the concept of the nation as reflected in Georgian periodicals between 1893 and 1917. The selected timeframe corresponds to the formative stage of the modern Georgian nation, during which the cultural phase of nation-building was completed mainly, and the political phase was emerging. Understanding the characteristics of the modern Georgian nation thus requires a historical perspective. The topic is particularly relevant as it explores how the press contributed to both cultural and political nation-building during a period when periodicals actively sought to awaken national sentiment and introduce Western theories of nation to the Georgian public. Notably, during this period, newspapers such as Kvali, characterised by their party alignment, began to appear. The role of the press in the formation and consolidation of the nation is crucial, as periodicals were a primary means of disseminating information—especially at a time when literacy rates were increasing. However, the topic also presents particular challenges, given that Georgia was part of the Russian Empire at the time. Press distribution and the impact of "print capitalism" are complex phenomena to study due to the pervasive censorship of the era.

In some cases, censorship was so severe that publishing had to be relocated abroad, as was the case with the newspaper Sakartvelo. Giorgi Laskhishvili observed that it was nearly impossible to raise or discuss national issues in the press under Tsarist censorship. He even noted that throughout an entire year, the phrase "local national self-government" could not escape censorship. This context makes the analysis of the press particularly compelling, as Georgian political and public figures had to find ways to utilise periodicals to convey the essence of the nation and explain its significance to readers.

This study aims to explore the narratives constructed around the concept of nation and the national question in Georgian periodicals between 1893 and 1917, to identify the main trends, and to highlight the key issues discussed across different publications. Accordingly, the research objectives are as follows: 1) To analyse the narratives of left-wing periodicals regarding the national question between 1893 and 1917; 2) To examine the content of periodicals (e.g., “Iveria”, “Tsnobis Purtseli”) that frequently addressed the importance of the national question during the research period; 3) To identify the core features through which different publications approached the concept of nation and the national question in the course of press analysis. Research Question: What trends can be identified in the way the concept of nation and the national question were discussed in Georgian periodicals between 1893 and 1917?

The conceptual framework of the study is grounded in the modernist theory of nationalism, specifically drawing on Benedict Anderson’s influential concept of “print capitalism” as articulated in his seminal work "Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism". The case of the formation of the modern Georgian nation can, to a certain extent, be interpreted through Anderson’s theoretical lens. The emphasis on strengthening the local language—often initiated by the first generation of elites returning from the “metropole”—resonates with the role played by Georgian intellectuals active in the 1860s. According to Anderson, the first stage of nation formation concludes when the vernacular language becomes the language of newspapers and books, leading to the nation perceiving itself as a cultural community. This phase is followed by a growing awareness of the need for political unity, ultimately culminating in the aspiration for statehood. From 1893 onward, political groups and parties emerging in Georgia actively utilised the press to disseminate their ideas and engage in debates with their opponents through a series of letters and articles. Print media was intended not only for political elites but for broader segments of society. In terms of its societal influence, Anderson famously referred to newspapers and journals as “one-day bestsellers,” emphasising their role in shaping collective consciousness.

This research is qualitative in nature and employs a discourse analysis method. Discourse analysis was chosen as the most appropriate method for examining the press, allowing for the investigation of how political groups and parties constructed and disseminated discourses on the national question through Georgian periodicals between 1893 and 1917. A key focus was the examination of debates among Georgian political and public figures conducted through the press. Based on this, the study identifies particularly resonant publications on the national question—texts that received significant public attention and prompted responses in the form of reply articles. The study adopts a particular strand of discourse analysis known as the “text and textuality” approach.

The research revealed that periodicals from 1893 to 1917 generally lacked terminological clarity, and both political and scholarly circles of the time rarely engaged in conceptual-level analysis of the national question. Instead, the press tended to focus on topics such as nationality, national character, and the significance of autonomy. When the concept of the nation was addressed in the press, it was typically within the broader context of posing the national question as a problem—often accompanied by attempts to identify possible solutions.

Local Self-Government and Data Protection: Regulatory Standards and Digital Risks

Aksana Guchua — 2025-12-23

The fast growth of digital technologies has created both new opportunities and serious challenges for local self-government bodies. Today, local governments work with large amounts of citizens' personal data. Therefore, protecting personal data properly is crucial. It helps build trust between citizens and local authorities and improves the quality of governance.

This paper examines the legal frameworks for personal data protection in Georgia and international law. Special attention is given to the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and its influence on Georgian legislation. It also outlines the key principles of Georgia's personal data protection law and the obligations local governments must adhere to.

The study also examines the real-world challenges that local governments face, including inadequate technical systems, insufficient staff training on data protection, and the growing risks of data breaches and cyberattacks. Based on the analysis, the paper proposes measures to enhance data protection and strengthen information security policies.

In conclusion, the study demonstrates that local self-government bodies must establish more effective systems for managing personal data, implement modern security standards, and encourage citizens to participate in protecting their own data.

Hegemonic Shocks and Georgia: Democratic Evolution and Democratic Backsliding

Valerian Dolidze — 2025-12-23

The work, based on S. Gunitsky's theory of hegemonic shocks, explains the processes of democratic evolution and democratic backsliding in Georgia. In the author's opinion, the case of Georgia confirms the theory, according to which hegemonic shocks not only cause hegemonic transitions, which imply a change in the configuration of power distribution in the international arena, but also have a profound impact on the internal institutional development of countries. If the unipolar world with a democratic hegemon determined the democratic evolution of Georgia, a democratic multipolar world has led to democratic backsliding. The paper identifies the mechanisms through which the hegemonic shocks influence the democratic evolution of Georgia. The unipolar world gave rise to an emulative political system, which determined the alternations of democratic and authoritarian cycles in the process of democratic evolution. This system tends to subordinate society to the state, but the democratic hegemon has restricted this tendency and ensured permanent democratic evolution, even during authoritarian cycles when democratic potential continued to rise. This was facilitated by the attractiveness of the West in Georgian society, as well as among the political elites and the opposition, who divided the world into "civilised" (the West) and uncivilised nations.

The cooperation between them and the West (the USA, EU) has determined the development of autonomous political and civil societies, free media, and free political behaviours. This contributed to the accumulation of the country's democratic potential, which was the primary vector of Georgia's political development in the unipolar world. The USA and EU not only blocked the undemocratic activities of pro-Western political elites, but also, in cooperation with them and the opposition, ensured democratic changes in governments through the free expression of societal will. Free political behaviours are the elements of democracy, which provide the necessary but not sufficient conditions for its development. To ensure the irreversibility of democratic evolution, they must create autonomous and influential political institutions. However, a lack of economic security, as well as cultural and other resources, limits the capabilities of significant and permanent autonomous mobilisation and organisation of free political behaviours. In these conditions, they periodically led to "democratic explosions" - direct actions and even changes in governments through them. Georgia reveals that free political behaviours without organisation lead to electoral authoritarianism. Lack of awareness and ideological and political articulation of social cleavages hindered the political organisation of free behaviours and restricted the development of the democratic political system in Georgia. This determined that the democratic evolution of it was based on the direct actions, free political behaviours of citizens, pro-Western orientations of society, elites, and opposition who cooperated with the USA and EU in promoting democracy. The lag of the autonomous self-organisation of the society behind the development of the bureaucracy produces a contradiction between the maturation of the political system and the political regime, which is understood as the way society and government interact.

The incomplete development of the political system prevents the full disclosure of the democratic potential of the political regime. Under these conditions, the West fulfilled the protective function of democratic evolution, and pro-Western political elites served as the primary conduits of Western influence in Georgia. The transition to the multipolar world raises the influence of authoritarian states. This creates a perception of weakness of the democratic hegemon (the USA) in the Georgian elite. As a result, it ends the cooperation with the USA and the EU in promoting democracy. As a result, free behaviour has lost significant resources for organising democratic institutions and developing civil initiatives; the normative component of the democratic political system has been significantly narrowed. All this contributes to the development of irresponsible governance and the establishment of unlimited dominance of the political elite, which determines the transition into another cycle of authoritarianism. However, unlike the previous ones, in the last case, the country transitions into a hegemonic electoral authoritarian phase, democratic evolution is interrupted, and the dismantling of democratic potential begins.

The role of nuclear weapons in global security, against the backdrop of the development of modern technologies and current challenges

Alika Guchua — 2025-12-23

In the modern period, many threats and challenges are emerging for international security, the prevention and management of which are becoming increasingly difficult. The scale of the challenges is immense and is exacerbated by the policies of aggressive states, the illicit actions of regional aggressive actors, terrorists, and criminal groups, among others. Among the weapons created by humanity in the world, one of the most powerful and destructive, along with radiation, is nuclear weapons, the arsenal of which is so large that it can destroy the Earth at least a hundred times. The process of developing modern technologies, especially in missile systems, increases the threat's dimension even further, as their speed, stealth systems, and destructive effects intensify. This paper aims to present the threats and challenges posed by nuclear weapons in the context of international security, against the backdrop of the development of modern technologies.

Since their creation, nuclear weapons have been a powerful, destructive weapon capable of destroying and harming millions of people. Accordingly, preventing a nuclear war should be the main task of all states. The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine has further increased the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, especially when officials of the Russian Federation, starting with the president, often mention the danger of starting a nuclear war. Especially when they directly threaten Ukraine and the West with the use of nuclear weapons. This threat is made even more urgent by the new nuclear doctrine of the Russian Federation, which provides for a preemptive strike on the enemy. This threat is compounded by the ongoing tension between India and Pakistan and the military clashes that occur at different times. China's position on the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which, instead of reducing its nuclear arsenal, is increasing its arsenal, is also of concern. As for North Korea's nuclear policy, it is like China increasing its nuclear arsenal and permanently threatening South Korea and the United States with the use of nuclear weapons. North Korea conducts prohibited nuclear tests, which violate international norms, but it blatantly violates them. Iran's nuclear program also poses a significant threat, as it is trying to create nuclear weapons, which will change the geopolitical situation in the Middle East. The creation of nuclear weapons by Iran is prevented by Israeli attacks on nuclear facilities and fuel necessary for missile systems, as well as other military arsenals. Nuclear weapons represent both a certain guarantee of security and a great threat, since their presence in the hands of aggressive states increases the risk of their use, and the nuclear non-proliferation treaties concluded during the Cold War are gradually being repealed and are being flagrantly violated. It is also important to have nuclear-free zones in the world, as their expansion would be beneficial for global security. Also, nuclear states should not work on the creation of new nuclear states, as this will further increase the threat of the use of these weapons. It should be noted that terrorists have been trying for years to seize the technologies for creating nuclear weapons and damage nuclear facilities, including nuclear reactors. At this time, it is inevitable for global geopolitical players to develop a common security policy, which will be aimed at developing more effective mechanisms for achieving global security in relation to weapons of mass destruction. The theoretical basis of the study encompasses the theories of deterrence, nuclear intimidation, balance of power, and nuclear terror. The study discusses the capabilities of nuclear weapon states, political relations between nuclear states, nuclear non-proliferation treaties, nuclear-free zones, nuclear missile systems and their classification.

Additionally, against the backdrop of the development of modern technologies, the role of artificial intelligence in enhancing the security of nuclear systems is being explored. In the standard geopolitical security framework, states should cooperate more to achieve common security. Even as the world forms a new world order, which is a complex and potentially tense process, global players must initiate active cooperation in the direction of nuclear security. Without which it is impossible to achieve global security. In this format, the world's leading international organisations also play a significant role.